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Abstract 
 
 For several decades following its independence from Great Britain, Ghana’s policies 
continued to promote over-extraction of natural resources to the detriment of its economy and 
rural communities.  Agricultural and forestry policy has gradually evolved to foster more 
sustainable and equitable practices, as in building partnerships with the private sector to fund 
infrastructure improvements.  Policy has recently recognized the dire need to adopt agricultural 
practices and means of forest resource extraction that are compatible with ecological 
stewardship.  However, many shortcomings are still apparent.  Large logging operations 
completely disregard forestry regulations with impunity, whereas rural sustenance extractors are 
severely punished in the rare event that policy is actually enforced.  Although the severe 
disadvantages that agricultural policies had imposed in the 1960s have been partially alleviated, 
much improvement is still needed.  Recent agricultural policy has recognized the lack of funding 
available to invest in more efficient and higher-yielding agricultural practices, but partnerships 
with the actual lending institutions do not exist.  The scarcity of crucial inputs, such as fertilizer 
and technical assistance remains a major problem in the agricultural sector, as the soils are 
becoming rapidly depleted, leading to declining crop yields and further encroachment on the 20 
percent of forests remaining.  Overly ambitious targets and unrealistic policies require more 
careful and detailed formulation so that Ghana’s resources can be managed effectively before 
famine sweeps the food-insecure country once more. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
West African agriculture was environmentally and economically sustainable prior 
to the 1960s (Onyeiwu et al 2010).  However, Ghanaian agriculture and forestry are both 
currently managed in a wasteful and inefficient manner.  Ghana’s forested lands have 
decreased from 8.2 million hectares in 1957 (Onyeiwu et al 2010) to only 1.6 million as 
of year 2000 (McDermott 2009).  The approximate three percent annual deforestation 
rate continues to diminish forested lands further.  Recent measures indicate that 28 
percent of Ghana’s forests were lost between 1990 and 2005, landing it at the world’s 
fifth-worst rate of deforestation during this period (McDermott 2009), following a ten 
percent decrease in natural forests between 1980 and 1990 (Ascher 1995).  Of the “40 
main marketable” lumber species, 16 are being cut highly in excess of what can be 
sustained (Glastra 1999: 84). 
This rapid deforestation carries with it severe consequences beyond the waste of 
potentially valuable resources.  Vegetation naturally regulates water supply and prevents 
erosion, so its destruction carries major ecological, economic, and human health 
implications.  High risk of wood fuel shortages, increased sediment deposits, floods, 
landslides, disappearance of water bodies, drought, dam siltation, increased prevalence of 
water-borne disease, bushfires (Agbosu 1983) and biodiversity loss are but a few (Food 
and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations 2004).   
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Ecology 
Over 90 percent of Ghana’s forests have been cut since the 1940s.  Ghanaian 
primary forests, which are ecologically superior to secondary forests (in carbon 
sequestration and biodiversity measures), basically disappeared in the 1980s (Glastra 
1999: 76).  Only approximately 20 percent of Ghana is forested at all (Trading 
Economics 2010).  
Deforestation degrades the land through soil erosion, nutrient depletion, and 
desertification.   Rainfall in Ghana has been declining by about 2.4 percent each decade 
since 1960.  Northeastern Nigeria has been experiencing similar problems.  In addition, 
the wet season has been shorter but more intense, resulting in increased runoff, flooding, 
and erosion, and decreased “infiltration”, all of which has been intensified by the lack of 
vegetation (Onyeiwu et al 2010).   
Declining soil quality is one of Ghana’s major problems.  “Slash and burn” 
agriculture, a practice in which most Ghanaians engage (Appiah et al  2007), is often 
identified as one of the main causes.  Fires can be used in hunting and to strategically 
alter plant species compositions and eliminate pests.  In addition, they are often used to 
get rid of brush and felled trees, which create uncontrolled fire hazards.  Though fires 200 
degrees Celsius or cooler are beneficial to the soil, those above 400 degrees Celsius 
diminish soil quality, as they “completely destroy the soil organic matter and reduce the 
cation exchange capacity” (Nsiah-Gyabaah 1996).  Improper fire management is 
common, so the soil is often harmed.   
While swidden agriculture often degrades the soil and contributes to deadly 
bushfires, the practice is not inherently destructive; if a given land area is not 
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overpopulated, the soil nutrients can be sustained (Science Daily 2010).  However, 
population pressures in Ghana greatly exceed the carrying capacity of the land, especially 
when coupled with poor management practices. 
Crop rotation rarely implemented.  Practically all soil nutrients “show a deficit”, 
since erosion and over-harvesting use more than are being provided in fertilizers.  Since 
fertilizer imports were reduced and subsidies eliminated in the 1980s, the price prohibits 
most farmers from enriching their soils.  Between 1978 and 1993, fertilizer use declined 
by roughly two-thirds.  Nitrogen could easily be captured from human waste, but it 
instead is disposed of improperly, posing a health hazard.  Due to rapid population 
growth, the soil is allowed only 2-3 years to fallow after 1-3 years of cropping, although 
eight to 15 years are needed “to regenerate soil fertility” (Onyeiwu et al 2010).  This 
diminishing soil quality leads to lower crop yields, economically straining the rural poor 
further.    
 
Soil/fertilizer  
Since subsidization of agricultural inputs (particularly fertilizers) ceased in 1983, 
they have been used sparingly.  A 2004 study conducted on maize, Ghana’s most 
important food crop, affirmed the importance of fertilizer.  It discovered that the 
progressive productivity decline in recent years was due to poor soil quality and lack of 
fertilizer; these are “the most important factors affecting maize yield”.  The major 
problems with the soil were found to be soil organic carbon, ECEC (which illustrates the 
soil’s ability to prevent positively charged ions from leaching out [Espinoza et al 2008]), 
and clay.  Hence, soil management that does not adversely affect soil organic matter and 
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water holding capacity should be promoted (Braimoh and Vlek 2004).  Removal of 
subsidies to agricultural inputs has almost certainly cost society more (by environmental 
degradation, other wasted resources, diminished food security, etc.) than the subsidies 
would have.  
Unfortunately, specific erosion and water pollution data are not readily available, 
due to the lack of research and information that hinders Ghanaian policymaking.  These 
data would provide invaluable insight into optimal land management practices and be 
extremely helpful in forming effective forestry and agricultural policy. 
 
Economics 
  Ghana’s economy relies heavily upon agriculture and forestry; the agricultural 
and forestry sector contains 60 percent of Ghana’s workforce (WorldFacts 2008).  Forests 
provide approximately 75 percent of Ghana’s energy, and they are the primary source of 
“food, clothing, shelter, furniture, water-supply sources, bushmeat, and traditional 
medicine for the local community” (Glastra 1999: 76, 84).  However, the percentage of 
land area devoted to agriculture is increasing rapidly; cultivated lands rose from 51 
percent of Ghana in the late 1960s to 65 percent in 2005.  Despite this rapid growth, 
agriculture’s contribution to GDP declined; agriculture accounted for 46 percent of the 
GDP in 1969 but only 37 percent in 2005 (Onyeiwu et al 2010).  This indicates that 
increasingly more resources are used to create decreasing levels of output.   
Agriculture cannot be easily sustained in nutrient-poor tropical soils, and most of 
the forestry resources previously available to Ghanaians have been destroyed; 85 percent 
of locals surveyed can no longer obtain food that was available in the forests 20 years 
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before.  It has also been noted: “loss of forest cover in Ghana has had an adverse effect 
on agricultural productivity and the environment” (Appiah et al  2007).  Since Ghanaians 
increase agriculture to compensate for decreased food sources in the forests, which in 
turn decreases agricultural activity, a vicious cycle is perpetuated. 
 Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) and the Import-Substitution Industrial 
(ISI) strategy have also contributed to Ghana’s rampant deforestation.  The ISI strategy’s 
aim was to bolster the economy by encouraging industrialization to decrease foreign 
dependency.  Because funds earned in the agricultural sector were used to finance this 
industrialization and crops were subsidized to lower urban living expenses (and 
subsequently product prices), agriculture was harmed.  Farmers’ incomes plummeted, 
though the world prices of the cash crops were rising.  Because the prices of 
manufactured goods were simultaneously increasing, the living conditions of rural 
inhabitants worsened.  Infrastructural development was also emphasized in urban areas 
and neglected in the rural parts.  Regardless of the efforts, industrial activity remained 
poor (Onyeiwu et al 2010). 
Ghana also enacted an SAP and the World Bank’s Export Rehabilitation Project 
(1983-86) to expand logging operations (Onyeiwu et al 2010).  This also improved the 
economy, though millions of dollars in illegal logging profits disappeared from Ghana 
because of corruption and fraud.  The SAP increase forestry products’ contribution to 
GDP from three to four percent in the 1980s to six to eight percent.  However, this was 
“achieved by logging the forest at unsustainable rates”.  Wood was priced below its real 
market value and production has been wasteful and inefficient; hence, the forests are 
exploited above economically beneficial amounts (Glastra 1999: 83). 
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Price controls and marketing boards that funneled most of the profits away from 
the farmers were removed under the SAP (Glastra 1999: 49).  However, rural to urban 
migration continued to increase, since the consumer price index for items in rural areas 
increased drastically.  In addition, subsidization for governmentally-provided social 
services and agricultural inputs was eliminated or drastically reduced, which also greatly 
increased the rural cost of living.  The agricultural sector was greatly weakened, 
increasing rural poverty.  Ecologically unsustainable use of natural resources has been 
driven by these things; over-logging for charcoal production to fuel cooking and other 
domestic activities is one of many common practices that exemplify this (Food and 
Agricultural Organization of the United Nations 2010). 
These problems already affect the nation’s youth.  Half of the children in rural 
areas and approximately one-fifth of the urban child population were engaged in 
economic activities in 2001.  Approximately 60 percent worked in agriculture, forestry 
and fishing activities (Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations 2010). 
This has limited educational opportunities for many of the children, in both the near and 
extended future.  Therefore, future generations are trapped into agricultural and forestry 
activities.  These individuals also remain unaware of more efficient and sustainable 
practices.  
 
Illegal  practices 
Rampant poaching and unregulated tree-felling are common practices in Ghana 
(Appiah et al  2007).  A 1994 Forestry Department study estimated 34 percent of logs to 
be illegally harvested.  “The main collaborators with illegal chain-saw operators are 
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district forestry officials, district chief executives and assembly people, law enforcement 
agents, chiefs and village elders, concessionaires, and wood sellers” (Glastra 1999: 83).  
Restricted forest management decisions and use have driven many Ghanaians to engage 
in illegal forestry practices, which lead to nearly complete degradation of those resources.   
 
Nutrition and Livelihood 
Though Ghanaians do not suffer from caloric deficits, the typical starchy diet is 
deficient in protein and vitamin A, which has led to stunted growth and blindness.  The 
forests formerly provided a more balanced diet, but much of the previously available food 
resources have been overexploited (Onyeiwu et al 2010).   
In addition, the majority of rural Ghanaians lives from “hand-to-mouth”; a large 
proportion of the population is in a very precarious position, especially considering the 
rapidly declining forest resources and agricultural productivity.  The forests continue to 
be the only source of wood for fuel, construction, and furniture for most Ghanaians 
(Appiah et al  2007).  With an average annual income of $248 US (2004) for most 
farmers and a GDP per capita of $1500 US (2009) (Central Intelligence Agency 2011) for 
the nation, many rural Ghanaians’ best option is forest collection, which costs nothing 
(Appiah et al  2007).  Due to declining resources, some rural inhabitants walk 12 hours to 
collect enough fuel wood to satisfy daily needs: “many Ghanaians and Nigerians enjoyed 
higher living standards in the 1960s than they did in the 1990s”.  People are beginning to 
migrate to urban areas because agricultural income is not sufficient and basic services 
(such as education and health care) are lacking; only 52 percent of Ghanaians lived in 
8 
 
rural areas in 2005, though 76 percent did in 1961.  In addition, 70 percent of urban 
Ghanaians live in slums (Onyeiwu et al 2010).  
 
Basic causes of deforestation 
 The factors contributing to Ghana’s high rates of deforestation are diverse.  Rapid 
population growth, land conversion to agriculture and livestock operations, unchecked 
tree felling, previous governmental policies (Food and Agricultural Organization of the 
United Nations 2004), mining, and forest fires all play large roles (Okrah 1999).  
Charcoal (along with other fuel wood) use, which is rural Ghana’s primary means of 
fueling cooking operations, also amplifies the problem; roughly 0.1 hectares of forest 
must be consumed to produce one ton of charcoal (Enterprise Works Ghana 2010), since 
wood must be burned in extremely hot kilns to create charcoal (Resch 2007). 
 The greatest contributor to deforestation is the sale of agricultural and timber 
products to outsiders.  In itself, timber extraction causes approximately 70 percent of 
Ghana’s deforestation (Okrah 1999), and most of these products are exported to the USA 
and Europe.  In addition, loggers receive lengthy concessions, some of which last longer 
than 50 years, and these parties undergo “little or no monitoring” (Resch 2007).  
The timber industry is comprised of approximately 500 logging companies, some 
of which are European-owned, that operate through long-term concessions and short-term 
licenses.  Some concessions are also too small to allow for proper management practices 
to be employed; some are as small as 2km2.  Because of inefficient logging techniques 
and wasteful timber processing, final lumber volume is only 25 to 40 percent of the total 
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log volume extracted” (Glastra 1999: 77).  Another ten to 15 percent of Ghana’s 
deforestation can be attributed to forest fires (Nsiah-Gyabaah 1996).  
 Tree plantations are also problematic; some view these as equivalent to forests, 
though their ecological impacts are very dissimilar (Okrah 1999).  The Ghanaian 
government has established a fund to promote plantation establishment, and the president 
appealed to poor community landowners to release land for this purpose (Okrah 1999). 
 The impacts of human settlement are not negligible, but some must rely forest 
lands for their livelihoods, and these effects are “comparatively minimal, and in some 
cases traditional methods of sustainability are applied” (Okrah 1999).  The most severe 
deforestation is orchestrated by those who do not live in and rely upon the forests.  Lack 
of dependence upon the land decreases incentives to employ sustainable practices. 
The establishment of forest reserves has been inadequate in the struggle against 
rampant deforestation.  Within forest reserves, only two percent is in excellent condition, 
14 percent of the forest reserve land has no forest, 15 percent is in very bad condition, 20 
percent is mostly degraded, 35 percent is partly degraded, and 14 percent is moderate 
(Blay et al 2009). 
 Ghanaian agricultural and forestry policy has evolved to adopt more of a focus on 
sustainable agriculture and forestry.  However, implementation is lacking.  Funding and 
enforcement of regulations are especially limited. 
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Chapter 2: Socio-Economic Impacts 
 
            Major measures of economic well-being have significantly improved, most 
notably during the 1990s.  However, agricultural productivity is rapidly declining, the 
majority of forest resources have been depleted, and policies have neglected the small-
scale forestry and agricultural actors that carry the most promise for sustained activity.  
The improvements are generally due to policies that push excessive resource exploitation.  
Adequate nutrition, though one of the most basic determinants of well-being, has been 
largely ignored by agricultural policy, and these negative impacts are very apparent.  
 
Nutrition 
           The agricultural sector directly and strongly impacts a society’s quality of 
nutrition, as it determines which foods are produced and the relative affordabilities.  
Processing of raw food inputs, which agricultural policy continues to promote, has 
immense nutritional implications, as nutrients are often lost.   
            Although the typical Ghanaian caloric intake is adequate, malnutrition, mostly 
due to inadequate micronutrient consumption, is an underlying factor of many deaths in 
Ghana.  Food security is also problematic, particularly in the Northern and Upper East 
regions (Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations 2009: 3).  Since at 
least 1966, the average Ghanaian caloric intake has had approximately the same 
composition: 79 percent carbohydrates, 12 percent fats, and nine percent proteins (Food 
and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations 2009: 19).  However, it is 
recommended that 45 to 65 percent of an adult’s caloric intake come from carbohydrates, 
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20 to 35 percent from fats, and ten to 35 percent from proteins (Institute of Medicine, 
Food and Drug Board 2002).  These imbalances, along with vitamin and mineral 
deficiencies, cause and exacerbate various health problems.  For example, vitamin A 
(sufficient consumption of which is necessary for healthy immune system function) 
cannot be absorbed without consumption of fats, so inadequate fat intake diminishes the 
body’s ability to process nutrients (ORC Macro 2005: 36).  Children are particularly 
vulnerable: in 1988, 31 percent of children were “stunted” and eight percent “wasted”1 
(Rawlings 1996: 22).  These figures remained mostly unchanged as of 2003, at 29 percent 
and seven percent, respectively.  Approximately 22 percent of children younger than five 
years are deemed underweight (compared with two percent in a well-nourished 
population) and three percent are overweight (ORC Macro 2005: 14). 
            In a nutritional study conducted in 2003, approximately 20 percent of the children 
surveyed between the ages zero months and five years died.  However, the typical under-
five mortality rate in Ghana has been estimated to be at 11 percent.  Though still quite 
high, this is at the lower end for sub-Saharan African countries.  Infectious diseases are 
the main cause of death in this age category, and (even minor) malnutrition is an indirect 
cause of this, as it increases the children’s susceptibility.  It has been estimated that 40 
percent of deaths before age five are related to severe and moderate malnutrition, with 
moderate malnutrition a factor in 88 percent of malnutrition-related deaths.  Between 0 
and 20 months, the minority of children (45 percent) is alive and not malnourished (ORC 
Macro 2005: 5-10).   
                                                 
1 “Wasting” is an indicator of acute malnutrition, in which a child is far too light than is healthy for his/her 
height.  In a healthy population, this figure is at about two percent (ORC Macro 2005: 14). 
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           Chronic malnutrition (as evidenced by stunting) was four percent lower during the 
mid-1990s than in 1988.  However, between 1998 and 2003, this has increased by three 
percent.  There was a two percent decrease in acute malnutrition, but this figure fluctuates 
greatly.  The percentage of underweight children, however, drastically decreased between 
1988 and 2003, down from 30 to 22 (ORC Macro 2005: 16).   
 
Poverty alleviation during the 1990s 
            An annual growth rate of five percent during the 1990s was mainly attributed to 
the Structural Adjustment Program created to mitigate for the economic crisis of the 
1980s (Jeffrey 2009).  However, the 1991 Medium-Term Agricultural Development 
Program and related policies also played a large role.  The 1991-2 and 1998-9 Ghana 
Living Standards Surveys (GLSS) showed that the percentage of Ghanaians below the 
poverty line (900 current Cedis annually) fell by 12 percent during that period.  Areas 
that produced cocoa experienced the most rapid poverty alleviation, but many other crops 
boomed.  Cassava production has increased by 400 percent and corn production by 300 
percent.  However, the expansion in growing areas responsible for this success cannot 
continue for much longer; forest reserves and “marginal lands” are encroached as farmers 
try to expand their lands, leading to vast deforestation and land degradation.  Poverty 
even increased among food crop farmers in the North, where the land is not conducive to 
an expansionary strategy (Asuming-Brempong 2003).    
Both national income and national disposable income greatly increased (relative 
to 1975 prices) throughout the 1980s and 1990s.  With a few exceptions (such as a 1991 
decrease), real agricultural income has been increasing since 1984.  However, the annual 
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growth rates in real income, real disposable income, and real agricultural income declined 
during the 1990s (Asuming-Brempong 2003).   
 
Other livelihood measures 
Several other indicators of well-being have been improving recently.  In 1996, 
only 53 percent of the adult population was literate, with 57 percent of the school-aged 
population enrolled (Rawlings 1996: 7).  There has been a minor improvement: 57.9 
percent of the adult population is now literate (Central Intelligence Agency 2011).  Life 
expectancy has also improved from 55 years in 1996 (Rawlings 1996: 21) to 61 years in 
2011 (Central Intelligence Agency 2011).  Both are a vast improvement from the 45 year 
expectancy of 1957 Ghana and significantly exceed the African average of 51 years.  
However, the average among all developing countries is 63 years and industrialized 
countries enjoy a life expectancy of 75 years (Rawlings 1996: 21), so there is much room 
for improvement.  Although Ghana continues to suffers from high rates of infant and 
child mortality, infant mortality decreased to approximately one in 20 (2011) from one in 
ten (1996) (Central Intelligence Agency 2011).   
 
Macroeconomic measures 
            Growth of real GDP decreased from an annual rate of 5.7 percent between 1989 
and 1989 to four percent between 1996 and 2001, which caused the rate of employment, 
overall labor productivity, and investment to decrease.  However, the national savings to 
GDP ratio has been increasing since a 4.4 percent low in 1993 (a sharp decline from 9.2 
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percent in 1990).  Agriculture has remained at approximately 40 percent of the GDP from 
2000 to 2008 (Asuming-Brempong 2003).   
Agricultural output has a strong inverse relationship with inflation rates, as food 
comprises a major proportion of spending.  Inflation steadily decreased from 122.8 
percent annually in 1983 to 10 percent in 1985, in part due to improved weather 
conditions (primarily increased precipitation), which caused the domestic price of food to 
fall.  But between 1986 and 2000, the annual rate of inflation fluctuated between 10.1 
percent and 70.8 percent (Asuming-Brempong 2003).   
  
Exchange rate 
            The Cedi drastically depreciated in relation to the US Dollar between 2000 and 
2004.  The volume of exported goods in 2004 was subsequently triple its 1996 value.  
However, imports of “import substitutes” like rice, poultry, and tomato paste also surged 
(Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2007: 57).  From 2000 to 2006, the effective real 
exchange rate was on the rise, reducing competitiveness of exports.  However, from 2007 
through 2009, it steadily decreased (Index Mundi 2010). 
 
The neglected rural population and potential for agriculture 
            Accra is now growing at approximately 4.4 percent annually (2003), compared to 
3.3 percent in 1984 (the national population growth rates were 2.5 percent and 2.6 
percent, respectively) (Asuming-Brempong 2003).  Rural areas tend to be 
disproportionately more economically disadvantaged and house 80 percent of Ghana’s 
poor (Rawlings 1996: 17).  In rural areas, 34 percent of rural children are stunted, 
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compared to 20 percent of children in large city areas and 26 percent in towns (ORC 
Macro 2005: 74).  Safe water access is greatly imbalanced as well: 93 percent of urban 
and 39 percent of rural had “nominal access” (Rawlings 1996: 22) 
 However, rural areas support the bulk of Ghana’s economy.  The agricultural 
sector contributed between 33.9 percent and 38.5 percent of the country’s foreign 
exchange earnings between 1999 and 2002 (Asuming-Brempong 2003).  However, most 
Ghanaians are eager to seek occupations in other sectors; the non-agricultural segment of 
the population (which is primarily urban) has been growing at about 3.2 percent annually 
(Asuming-Brempong 2003).   
 
Agricultural sector funding 
In 1998 and 1999, bank loans to agriculture increased to 12.2 percent of loans (up 
from 5.7 percent in 1995), but this percentage has been declining since.  Rural banks in 
particular have performed slightly better but still leave the agricultural sector with 
inadequate funding (Asuming-Brempong 2003).  Lending rates from commercial rates 
have been astronomically high.  The minimum and maximum nominal lending rates 
subject to the agricultural sector between 1997 and 2002 ranged from 27 and 50 percent 
to 39 and 55 percent.  The real rates ranged from approximately seven and 17 percent to 
19 and 37 percent (Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations 2005).  
Hence, funding is scarce and expensive.  
 
 
 
16 
 
The minor input subsidies of 2008 and 2009 were largely ignored 
 Fertilizer subsidies in 2008 and 2009 based on vouchers given to farmers (with a 
unique price set for 50-kilogram bags in each district) had a very small impact on the 
agricultural sector.  Most fertilizer retailers sold without vouchers: 86 percent of sellers in 
2008 and 84 percent in 2009.  The vast majority of venders who did not accept vouchers 
cited inability to redeem the vouchers as the primary reason for not accepting them, but a 
few also stated difficulty of redemption and lack of fertilizer (Krausova and Banful 2010: 
26).   
The bulk of vouchers received were redeemed through other agricultural input 
dealers (47 percent in 2008 and 52 percent in 2009), as most retailers did not have 
relationships with fertilizer importers who could redeem the vouchers directly.  The 
indirect relationships hindered voucher redemption and required trusting a chain of 
diluted accountability.  Many dealers were compensated for the vouchers with credit (44 
percent in 2008 and 47 percent in 2009).  Approximately one-fourth of retailers who 
participated in 2008 and 2009 received the cash value for the vouchers.  However, about 
20 percent of retailers were reportedly never paid for at least part of the vouchers 
submitted both years, several were forced to redeem the vouchers for other products 
instead of cash, and many payments were delayed (Krausova and Banful 2010: 27).   
 
Lack of affordability constrains technological advancement 
 Lending rates available to the agricultural sector were close to 50 percent annually 
in the 1990s.  This creates somewhat of a vicious cycle between lack of technology and 
lack of funding, and productivity consequently suffers.  Available technologies are 
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outdated and costly.  Foreign firms receive subsidies from their governments and 
therefore have more technologically advanced agricultural methods and can more easily 
produce higher quality goods at a lower cost (Asuming-Brempong 2003).  Furthermore, a 
history of political instability, changing policies, and inflation discourage the meaningful 
investments necessary to foster sustainable economic growth.  
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Chapter 3: Forestry Policy 
 
 Forestry policy in Ghana has historically been lacking in its capacity to solve 
rampant deforestation.  Europeans sought to make money in Ghana and leave as soon as 
that was accomplished, so British and other Western forestry companies were not 
concerned with long-term ecological impacts.  The Ghanaian government also did not 
prioritize sustainability: although the state gained independence in 1957 (and therefore 
changed in various political, social and economic regards), there was no major forestry 
policy review between 1948 and 1992 (Ghana Forestry Commission 2005).   
 
Early policy 
 While still a British colony (the Gold Coast), Ghana’s first policy relating to 
forestry was adopted in 1883.  The Native Jurisdiction Ordinance of 1883 enabled 
Traditional Councils (comprised of natives) to enact by-laws to protect water courses and 
to conserve forests (Agbosu 1983: 169-187).  However, the Traditional Councils did not 
exercise their power to create reserves.  Shortly after, in 1894, the Report of the 
Commission on Agricultural Potential of the Gold Coast was published, informing British 
business of the economic potentials of the forests and spurring an exponential increase in 
timber exports to Europe at the turn of the 20th century. 
 
Large-scale logging policy 
 The first regulation specifically pertaining to logging was the 1900 Concessions 
Ordinance No. 14, which provided Gold Coast citizens the right to grant concessions on 
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their own lands as they pleased, so long as this complied with customary law.  However, 
the concession owners were required to validate the concessions in court within six 
months of being granted, posing a major logistical challenge (Adjei 1994).  Policy to 
control commercial logging of younger trees was introduced in 1907 to enhance forest 
regeneration.  Since “timber cutters never confined timber felling to trees of full growth”, 
the Governor proposed the Timber Protection Ordinance, which prohibited cutting trees 
with diameters less than those proposed for each tree species without written permission 
by a District Commissioner.  A scientific review of the types of trees that could be felled 
sustainably was conducted but involved complex observations incomprehensible to local 
communities.  Another report (by the 1908 Pennington Commission) found that many 
timber cutters had no licenses and therefore timber felling regulation was very limited.  
Companies and natives alike complained of the regulation; indigenous people had been 
felling smaller trees sustainably and relied upon them for certain uses.  Hence, this 
Ordinance was revoked in 1908 (Agbosu 1983: 169-187).  
 Nevertheless, governmental control of forests progressively strengthened.  The 
Forestry Department was created in 1908.  Enactment of the 1911 Forest Ordinance 
provided the governor power to declare any unoccupied land a forest reservation.  
Resource exploitation within these areas required Reserve Settlement Officers’ 
permission (Adjei 1994).   
 
Forestry Estates 
 Forestry estates were set aside in 1939, but governmental support backing 
enforcement was minimal.  Increasing population and agricultural demands, coupled with 
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mass disobedience of pre-existing regulations, prompted Ghana's 1948 Forest Policy, 
which provided management for permanent forest estates, along with forestry research.  
The 1948 policy pushed protection and management of reserves, but all forests outside of 
the permanent reserves were left for conversion to agricultural land, and no resources 
were provided to implement the law (International Development and Research Centre 
2003).   
 
Failure to regulate logging 
            The 1951 Concessions Ordinance, which required acquisition of timber 
concessions, also failed to provide governmental oversight.  The concession holders were 
required to deliver an annual statement of profits incurred from concessions to the 
Treasury.  Negligence of this could carry a 50 pound (or $140 current US) fine.  One 
could also be fined up to five pounds daily for noncompliance with the Ordinance, but it 
was mostly ignored, as enforcement was very weak.  Since revenue collection was the 
priority, timber operations remained unregulated (Agbosu 1983: 169-187). 
 
Policy based on environmental concerns 
            Other attempts to minimize the ecological impacts of deforestation focused on 
scientific forestry initiatives.  The 1953 Land Planning and Soil Conservation Act 
addressed mitigation and prevention of soil erosion, land reclamation, and water use 
(Ghanaian Environmental Protection Agency 1953).  Between 1956 and 1970, the 
Modified Selection System was implemented through “the selective exploitation of 
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mature species, governed by minimum-girth limits” so that the forests could regenerate 
(International Development and Research Centre 2003).        
            Because of this system’s ineffectiveness, the government reverted to simpler, 
more direct, and heavy-handed control.  The 1959 Protected Timber Lands Act (Act 34) 
deemed off-reserve forest land protected timber lands, giving the Forestry Department the 
ability to regulate farm development and control agricultural expansion (Kotey et al 
1998: 82,100).  However, this direct assertion of power was reversed with the 1960 
Forests Improvement Fund Act (Act 12), which established a Forest Improvement Fund 
(Forestry Commission of Ghana 2000).  The FIF was created to “establish an 
improvement fund for forest reserves and to provide for the control of revenue derived 
from forest reserves” (Odoom 2005: 37).   This also severed the Forestry Department’s 
management of Forestry Reserves, and accountability to landowners was eliminated 
regarding the revenue’s use; the Act eliminated all individual forest reserve account and 
previous agreements in the Working Plans that provided state accountability of revenue 
(Marfo 2006: 17).   
           The 1961 Wild Animals Preservation Act enabled the minister to appoint honorary 
game officers (Government of Ghana 1961: 2).  Hunting “trophy” export was prohibited 
unless a permit was granted by a superior police officer.  Hunting via motor vehicles 
(including aircraft) and strategic fire setting was also prohibited in this act.  Arrests 
without warrant were also permitted (Timber Industry Development Division 2009).  But 
it was not until four years later, in 1965, when the Department of Game and Wildlife was 
deemed an official Ministry of Forestry agency (International Development and Research 
Centre 2003).    
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Communally-owned lands 
The 1962 Administration of Lands and Concessions Acts further deprived rural 
communities of previous rights.  The Administration of Lands Act (Act 123) enabled the 
federal government to manage community-owned lands and collect revenues from them 
(Amoako-Nuama 1999: 6).  The Concessions Act (Act 124) provided timber concessions 
and central governmental management of timber resources, both on and outside of 
reserves (Odoom 2005: 32). Hence, the combined impact of the 1962 acts prohibited 
farmers from using trees on their properties. 
 
Timber marketing control 
In 1963, the Ghana Timber Marketing Board was established to regulate timber 
and wood product exportation (Timber Industry Development Division 2009).  The 
Timber Operations (Government Participation) Decree of 1972 provides the Ghanaian 
government power to be the majority shareholder, hold governing board positions, and 
engage in general management of timber companies (Government of Ghana 1972).  The 
Forest (Protection) Decree of 1974 also greatly limits community use of forest reserves 
and establishes Forest Officers’ powers.  Criminal penalties for violations of forestry 
laws (including “damaging of trees, cultivation, creating fires, obstructing of water flows, 
hunting or fishing or grazing or trespassing of cattle”) in a Forest Reserve were 
introduced.  However, collection of non-timber forestry products for domestic use only 
was permitted (Forestry Commission of Ghana 2000). 
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Strict policy 
The 1974 Trees and Timber Act (N.R.C.D. 273) attempted to improve inspection 
effectiveness by dividing Ghana into forestry regions.  Property registration was 
mandated before tree felling was permissible.  Logs were required to be labeled with the 
cutter’s property mark, which is given during registration with the office of the Forestry 
Commission (Government of Ghana 1972).  The registration fee for a property was 
400,000 Ghanaian Cedis (roughly the same equivalent in current USD).  The registrations 
expired every six months from the date of issue, and the renewal registration fee was 
200,000 Cedis.  This was later amended to last for two years.  If the application was made 
after the registration expired, the registration fee was 400,000 Cedis.  Arrest without 
warrant by a “police officer or forest officer or a person authorized by the Minister” was 
declared legal if “that officer or person reasonably suspects” that the suspect “committed 
or have been concerned (sic) in the commission of an offence” under the Trees and 
Timber Act, if the suspect does not give a name and address for the timber (or gives a 
name and address that is suspected to be false), or “if there is reason to believe that the 
suspected person may abscond”.  However, the person may not be held for more than 48 
hours before being released or taken before a Magistrate (Government of Ghana 1974).  
In addition, felling timber for export without a valid property mark became a criminal 
offense (Kotey 1998: 82). 
The 1977 Amendment to the Timber Industry and Ghana Timber Marketing 
Board Decree (SMDC 128) prohibited exportation of any timber products by any entity 
other than the Ghana Timber Marketing Board (or parties authorized by it).  This carried 
a potential prison sentence of 15-30 years.  The Timber Marketing Board also set the 
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prices of timber for domestic sales and held the power to determine the percentages of 
products that timber processors could sell domestically and abroad.   The Minister was 
also provided with the power to create regulations for the Act’s enforcement 
(Government of Ghana 1977).  
 
Chainsaw regulation 
 Chainsaw ownership requires registration with the District Assembly.  Wood 
harvested with a chainsaw may only be used “for social or community purposes and shall 
not be sold or exchanged” (Forestry Commission of Ghana 1998).  Some reasons to ban 
chainsaw felling are: higher levels of waste, greater risk of wildfires, and faster felling 
(Parker 2011).  However, roughly 78 percent of domestically purchased timber was felled 
by chainsaw (Forestry Commission of Ghana 2010).   
The 1982 Timber Concession Revesting Law (PNDCL 17) removed 1,473 square 
miles of timber felling land from indigenous logging companies (Daily Graphic 2003).  
Subsequently, illegal chainsaw timber felling drastically increased.  
1991 marked the first of eight years during which chainsaw use was legalized 
through a permit-based system (Odoom 2005: 42-8).   This was to support the 
construction boom.  However, more trees were felled than were approved by permits; this 
was related to the log export boom to Asia (42).  Permit issuance was “streamlined” in 
1994, but the accompanying inspections to verify legal compliance were not carried out, 
due to limited resources by enforcement agencies.  To mitigate for practically 
unrestrained chainsaw timber felling, “timber task forces” were created in 1996.  
Although those who assisted in the arrests of chainsaw operators were given 30 percent 
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of seized timber, many members of the Forestry Commission and other enforcement 
agencies collaborated with illegal operators.  Finally, the Legal Instrument 1518 was 
repealed, and LI 1649—which outlawed chainsaw harvesting—was enacted.  Legal 
Instrument 1649 also addressed the problem of corruption among enforcers (43).  
However, chainsaw operations are reportedly increasing (44).  
When the contractor ceased operation, the Chief Conservator of Forests (with the 
approval of the Forestry Commission) was permitted to cut remaining wood, with 
branches and scraps given to benefit the forest community.  Certain species could not be 
logged without a special permit; otherwise this was considered an offense.  Offenses and 
penalties were given for: obstruction of Forestry Department or Forest Products 
Inspection Bureau inspections, possession of improperly labeled or unmarked timber, 
possessing timber without a conveyance certificate, owning an unregistered chainsaw, 
using an unregistered chainsaw, failing to properly mark felled timber, selling timber 
felled with a chainsaw, permitting unregistered chainsaw felling on one’s property, and 
felling or possessing felled timber of a “restricted species”.  Officers who aided those 
breaking regulations were also liable and guilty of an offense (Forestry Commission of 
Ghana 1998).   
Communities organize to illegally demand rent from timber companies.  In doing 
so, they “are tacitly supporting raids of company concessions by chainsaw operators – 
who at least pay rent up front” (Odoom 2005: 38-9).  In addition, “many landowners and 
farmers would rather negotiate secretly with chain-saw operators to have the trees on 
their land illegally harvested than allow the legitimate concessionaires to harvest the trees 
and pay token compensation”.  Timber dealers who do not cut locally own 60-80 percent 
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of chainsaws.  These chainsaw timber dealers reap all of the benefits while the local 
inhabitants only transport the equipment and wood for short-distance carries.  Although 
chainsaw-cut timber is illegal, it comprises 70 percent of locally-sold timber (Odoom 
2005: 7-8).   
 
Bushfires 
            Seasonal bushfires between 1982 and 1984 were particularly destructive; between 
1982 and 1983, roughly 50 percent of Ghana’s vegetation and 35 percent of its crops and 
agricultural stores were destroyed (Ampadu-Agyei 1988).  Human activities that 
contribute to bushfires include clearing the land for cultivation, flushing out game, 
protection against dangerous animals, cooking, carrying fire brands, grudge fires to settle 
disputes, smoking, religious and ceremonial practices, and deliberately sparked fires to 
avoid repaying loans used to finance rice farms.  PNDC (Peoples National Defense 
Council) Law 46 (1983) prohibited the setting of bushfires except for certain agricultural, 
forestry, and game management uses.  The 1983 Control of Bush Fires Law criminalized 
“intentional, reckless, or negligent” cause of bushfires and held offenders liable for all of 
the fires’ repercussions (Kotey et al 1998: 82).  Though the penalties were strict and the 
government followed through with enforcement actions, bushfires remain a major 
problem (Daily Graphic 2003).  
            Unlike its 1983 predecessor, the 1990 Control and Prevention of Bushfires Law 
(PNDCL 229) aimed to regulate and prevent bushfires through public awareness and 
district assembly-controlled burning rather than imposing harsh penalties to the 
offenders.  PNDCL 192 marked a great improvement over the failure to address bushfires 
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with undetermined fault in PNDCL 46.  However, PNDCL 229 did not specify which 
agency would implement the law or even how this would be performed (Ghanaian 
Environmental Protection Agency 1990). 
 
Mining 
 Although mining has detrimental effects on forested lands, it was deregulated in 
1983 to spark economic activity.  Mining activity (especially small-scale efforts) 
skyrocketed (Library of Congress 2010). 
The Minerals and Mining Act (Act 703, 2006) “states that a mineral right holder 
has sufficient authority to enter the land in respect of which the right is granted subject to 
negotiating compensation with affected farmers (Section 73) and paying compensation 
based on compensation principle” (Ghana News Agency 2010a).  Every mineral (in its 
natural state) belongs to the government of Ghana.  The government can also claim land 
when necessary to extract the minerals.  Mining activities may also be prohibited on 
certain lands.  The government has complete control over granting mining rights, and 
possessing those rights gives complete water use rights as well (Government of Ghana 
2006: 5).  
 
Major restructuring  
           Due to the 1948 Forest Policy’s failure, the Forestry Department began to review 
its practices in 1984.  This led to some restructuring within the organization.  The Timber 
Export Development Board Law of 1985 (PNDCL 123) established the Timber Industry 
Development Division (TIDD), which functions to promote and develop timber 
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marketing (Appiah 1999, Ghana Forestry Commission 2005).  TIDD is one of the three 
“operational elements” of the Ghana Forestry Commission (the other two are the Forest 
Services Division and the Wildlife Division) (Ghana Forestry Commission 2005). 
PNDCL 123 and PNDC Law 117 replaced the 1963-established GTMB with the Timber 
Export Development Board (TEDB) and the Forest Products Inspection Bureau (FPIB) 
(Timber Industry Development Division 2009). 
 
World Bank-funded projects of the late 80s and early 90s 
The World Bank financed a $24 million project for the importation of logging 
equipment in 1986 to bolster Ghana’s struggling economy (Ampadu-Agyei 1988).  To 
mitigate for the resulting acceleration in deforestation (in part due to the World Bank 
project), the 1989-1997 Forest Resources Management Project was introduced, 
establishing several water protection laws.  However, there was no clear cut policy or 
financial commitment. 
 The 1989-92 Forest Resource Management Project supported implementation of a 
“sustained yield policy”.  Forestry conservation and tree planting on farms were 
encouraged.  The policy was backed by creating a rural forestry program, initiatives to 
support forestry education and research, and strengthening forestry institutions (World 
Bank 2000a). 
 
Efforts for improved implementation  
The 1991 National Environmental Action Plan was created to address ecological 
problems in the areas of land management, water resource management, marine and 
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coastal ecosystems, mining and hazardous chemicals, human settlement, and forestry and 
wildlife (Benneh 2011).  The Environmental Protection Council was to report and 
coordinate actions to enforce NEAP, but the Council had no enforcement powers 
(Library of Congress 2010).   
Previous legislation created 282 forest reserves and 15 wildlife protected areas; 
these comprise over 38,000 km or about 16 percent of land area.  Outside of these 
reserves, roughly 4,000 km of forest were rapidly disappearing and lacking protection.  
To address this problem, Article 269 of the 1992 Constitution established the Forestry 
Commission, along with its functions and structure (International Development and 
Research Centre 2003).  The 1993 Forestry Commission Act (Act 453) reinforced this 
(Kotey et al 1998: 83).  
 
Forest and Wildlife Policy (1994) 
The 1994 Forest and Wildlife Policy, which is mainly still in effect, was a major 
reformation of Ghana’s outdated forestry regulations, most of which originated during 
colonial times.  Environmental impact statements were introduced.  National lands were 
reserved for mixed uses, though mostly for exploitation of forest resources.  Unclaimed 
lands became regulated by the Forestry Department.  These forests, forest reserves, and 
wildlife protected areas became managed under “detailed prescriptions… to guide 
sustainable management”, and more effective enforcement mechanisms, such as periodic 
audits of forestry operations, were specified.  Timber rights were awarded by competitive 
bidding and forest and wildlife fees were regularly reviewed to reflect economic value, 
increasing revenue collection.  Timber processing, improved milling efficiency, and 
30 
 
exploitation of lesser-used timber species were also encouraged through various 
initiatives, such as specialized training programs for wood processing operators and 
produce graders.  Wild animal production and forest plantations were other state-funded 
forestry investments (International Development and Research Centre 2003). 
The policy aimed to “sustainably develop wildlife potential”, regulating trade and 
consumption of “highly valued” and endangered species.  A National Parks and protected 
areas network (along with its proposed management practices) was established, along 
with national tree planting programs (International Development and Research Centre 
2003). 
Public awareness and local community participation in natural resource protection 
and land reservations were promoted.  Various stakeholder groups were required to be 
integrated in consultations (though the Forestry Commission and district conservation 
committees) to address the problems of wildfires in at-risk areas, illegal farming and 
encroachment upon protected areas, and pollution.  In addition, local access to traditional 
uses of forestry products and participation in policy formation was improved, and 
farmers’ land and tree tenure rights were restored (International Development and 
Research Centre 2003).  Bureaucratic controls on the marketing of wood exports were 
weakened while dialogue with the private sector was enhanced.  Ironically, there was 
little stakeholder consultation during the policy’s development. 
            Inter-ministerial cooperation and maintenance of an interagency coordinating 
committee was promoted.  Accordingly, a holistic research database for forestry and 
wildlife studies was proposed.  In addition, human resource development programs were 
implemented to improve planning and management in the private sector and 
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communities.  The policy also aimed to improve dialogue with international entities, 
trade associations, private interest groups, and NGOs concentrated on sustainable natural 
resource management (International Development and Research Centre 2003). 
            The Forestry and Wildlife Departments were reorganized to improve “monitoring, 
coordination, and accountability”.  Likewise, previous legislative and administrative 
means were reviewed.  Adequate funding was arranged for resource management.  
Accounting practices were also improved, enhancing accuracy and collection of resource 
utilization revenues (International Development and Research Centre 2003).   
 NGOs view the policy as a “useful advocacy tool”; the policy adopts collaborative 
forestry management (CFM) and studies of “environmental, cultural, scientific, and 
social functions of forestry” (Forest Watch Ghana 2006: 21).  It also prefers “low volume 
high value” timber extraction, which is optimal because it decreases waste.  However, 
post-1994 legislation did not allow for collaboration with the rural communities (Forest 
Watch Ghana 2006: 22).   
 
Further support of the Policy 
            Several laws and plans institutionalize the Forest and Wildlife Policy.  The 1994 
Act 490 established the Ghanaian Environmental Protection Agency, which is stronger 
than the Environmental Protection Council (EPC), the previous environmental agency 
(Library of Congress 2010, Ghanaian Environmental Protection Agency 2011). 
            The 1994 Lands Commission Act required the newly formed Lands Commission 
to manage public “and any other lands vested in the President by the Constitution” and to 
recommend policy regarding land use to the national government (Ghanaian 
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Environmental Protection Agency 2011).  In 1995, interim measures were established to 
control illegal timber harvesting outside of reserves, enabling farmers to veto timber 
felling on their lands and to be compensated for crop damage (Kotey et al 1998: 83). 
The 1996 Forestry Development Master Plan was to “guide the implementation of 
the Forest and Wildlife Policy” (International Tropical Timber Organization 2006: 99).  
The FDMP has three time horizons during which it expects to achieve its objectives 
(which are managing and enhancing its forest and wildlife resources, promoting “viable 
and efficient” forestry industries [especially promoting more advanced processing], 
promoting public awareness and rural involvement in forestry and conservation efforts, 
promoting more scientific and technological forestry and wildlife management, and 
developing national, regional, and district levels of forest and wildlife management), 
spanning the period 1996-2020 (Oduro 2002: 32-34).  This makes implementation of the 
FDMP more manageable.  The 1998 Wildlife Development Plan was created to facilitate 
implementation of the 1994 Forest and Wildlife Policy (Japan International Cooperation 
Agency 1999: 22). 
 
Timber Resources Management Act and Regulations 
The Timber Resources Management Act of 1997 introduced Timber Utilization 
Contracts (to replace timber concessions) and Social Responsibility Agreements.  This 
was yet another instance of timber regulations and procedures discriminating against 
small-scale efforts.  In addition, the new policies were crafted in a way that fosters 
arbitrary implementation, increasing the potential for corruption.  
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Also in 1997, levies were introduced to exports of nine air-dried timber species 
(Forestry Commission of Ghana 1998) and rough log exportation was banned (Benneh 
2011).  Though annual allowable timber extraction from forest reserves have been more 
strictly controlled, harvesting limits outside of reserves have been relaxed to compensate 
(Forestry Commission of Ghana 2010).    
            The 1998 Timber Resources Management Regulations called for inventories to 
determine the suitability of lands for timber utilization contracts.  The decision is made 
by the Chief Conservator of Forests through a field inspection that includes input from 
the Traditional Council, land owners (if applicable), and governmental forestry officers.  
The District Chief Executive must identify owners and farmers of land for field 
inspection.  The suitability of the land for timber concessions is judged on “quality, 
quantity, and value” of timber, topography, and special characteristics (including water 
bodies and roads).  Owners are given 21 days to consent to timber rights on the land and 
verify that there exist no “conflicting claims” upon that property.  The reports pass 
through the Forestry Department and eventually to the Chief Conservator of Forests.  
However, the notices are only required to be posted at the District Assembly, Traditional 
Council, and District Forest offices (Forestry Commission of Ghana 1998); it is unclear 
how the typical rural subsistence farming community would ever see these.  Obtaining 
transportation from the rural communities to these offices is difficult.   The law is also 
unclear about situations during which the landowners do not respond.   
            When the landowner objects or there are conflicting claims of interest on the land, 
the District Forest Officer must refer the case to a committee, comprised of a 
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representative of the Administrator of Stool Lands2, two representative of the District 
Assembly, and a Traditional Council representative.  The chairman of that committee is 
the representative of the Traditional Council.  The proceedings are informal and “guided 
by natural justice”.  If the committee report considers the objection reasonable, it will 
forward its recommendation document (which also contains the land survey and 
boundary specifications, topographic maps and plans, the consent or objection and 
grounds, and conflict resolution if available) to the Regional Forest Officer.  The 
Regional Forest Officer then reviews the report for accuracy and may include his own 
recommendations or exclude those made by the committee.  However, the law states that 
the conflict or refusal to grant land rights must first be settled and written consent 
obtained before the timber utilization contracts are granted.  “Where any public identified 
as suitable for the grant of timber rights and endorsed by the Chief Conservator of Forests 
is also identified by any other state institution to be suitable for some other national 
purpose, the matter shall be resolved by the Minister and any other Minister concerned” 
(Forestry Commission of Ghana 1998). 
Once land ownership has been verified, the land’s information is advertised, 
inviting parties to apply for the timber rights (and permitting verification).  Requirements 
for the submission of each land use application include payment of a fee, evidence of 
timber company ownership or forestry partnerships, and proposed operations.  The 
Timber Rights Evaluation Committee awards points based upon proper completion of the 
form, whether the applicant intends to process the wood, the competence and 
qualifications of the timber operations staff, the timber operations record of the applicant 
(if existent), previous timber rights held, the harvesting plan’s details, financial and 
                                                 
2 “Stool lands” are communally owned properties. 
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technical ability to carry out the operations, the environmental impacts, fire protection 
plans, economic impacts, suitability of roads and logging equipment, proposed security 
measures against illegal encroachment, and proposed disposal of logging and milling 
operation remains.  Any applicant whose request scores above an arbitrary number of 
points determined by the Evaluation Committee is invited to submit proposals on 
reforestation and deforestation plans and social responsibility agreements to aid the forest 
communities in an amount not exceeding five percent of the annual royalty from 
operations under the timber utilization contract operations.  The Evaluation Committee 
recommends the award to be given to the highest scoring applicant.  The Evaluation 
Commission then submits the report of the applicants and its recommendations to the 
Minister (Forestry Commission of Ghana 1998).  Though the process seems to be 
competitive, arbitrary cutoffs and subjective requirements promote corrupt awarding of 
concessions. 
 The Attorney General determines various contract conditions, including the size 
and limits of the contract area, contract duration, prescriptions by the Forestry 
Department to which the contract holder must adhere, rent payment to the landowner, 
grounds for termination or suspension of the contracts, and provision of social services to 
the communities impacted.  Successful applicants must sign a contract agreeing to these 
terms with representatives of the communities.  District Forest Officers will monitor 
compliance within his district, and the Forestry Department will conduct occasional 
audits.  Inspectors of the Forestry Commission, the Forest Products Bureau, and the 
Forestry Department may inspect timber operators to verify that they are producing in 
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accordance with their records.  Felled trees must all be marked, numbered and 
documented (Forestry Commission of Ghana 1998).   
The stumpage fee royalties, payable to the landowner, are based upon estimates 
prepared by the District Forest Officer (Forestry Commission of Ghana 1998).  The stool3 
(or other landowner) only receives half of the stumpage fee; the Forestry Commission 
collects the other half (Forestry Commission of Ghana 2010).  The District Forest Officer 
measures the volume of timber within 48 hours of extraction.  Timber cannot be moved 
unless timber conveyance certificates certify that this has occurred (Forestry Commission 
of Ghana 1998).   
 
National Land Policy (1999) 
 The 1999 National Land Policy prohibited any lands with primary forest cover to 
be cleared for the creation of tree plantation or mining activity operations (Japan 
International Cooperation Agency 1999: 33).  All lands deemed forest reserves are “‘fully 
protected’ for ecosystem maintenance, biodiversity conservation, and sustainable timber 
production” (Ghana News Agency 2010a).  In addition, no timber production activities 
are permitted at gradients of 30 degrees and steeper.  However, agriculture, mining, 
human settlement, and other activities are permitted in those circumstances.  Areas within 
100 meters of a water body’s “high water mark” were declared “protected areas” 
(Amoako-Nuama 1999: 15).  An important object of this policy is to “protect the rights of 
landowners and their descendants from becoming landless or tenants on their own land” 
(Amoako-Nuama 1999: 11).  Prohibited activities include wetland drainage, damming 
water courses feeding into wetlands, creating settlements and infrastructure in wetlands, 
                                                 
3  “Stool” is a term for the traditional communal land owner. 
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waste disposal in the wetlands, and mining in wetlands (Amoako-Nuama 1999: 15).  
However, “farming, grazing, fishing, timber production and salt-wining” are permitted in 
these areas (Amoako-Nuama 1999: 16).   
 The government may deem “any land with potential for ecosystem maintenance, 
biodiversity or scenic beauty preservation” a protected area.  In these cases, the 
government must pay annual rent as compensation (Amoako-Nuama 1999: 15).  
 Ghanaians do not enjoy extensive property rights.  Various problems plague land 
management, such as “land encroachments, multiple sales of residential parcels, 
unapproved development schemes, haphazard development” (Forestry Commission of 
Ghana 2010).  Because there are no reliable land maps, the boundaries of stool/skin lands 
are not clear (Forestry Commission of Ghana 2010).  Ownership of vested lands is split 
between traditional communities and the government.  Some of the payment due to the 
landowners from governmental acquisitions is much delayed, placing landowners in a 
difficult position.  Stool, skin, clan or family land cannot pass to family or descendants 
more than what the other land holding community members are entitled to: “unless 
approved by the appropriate public authority, no land use change of any kind will be 
countenanced”.  The government can acquire land whenever it desires, and it also “may 
intermediate in facilitating investors’ access to land owned by stools, skins, clans, 
families, or individuals” (Forestry Commission of Ghana 2010).  
 
Environmental Permits and Impact Assessments 
 The 1999 Environmental Assessment Regulation LI 1652 provided for 
Environmental Permits (this was lately amended in 2002 with minor logistical changes) 
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(Ghanaian Environmental Protection Agency 1999: 1-4).  Environmental Permits are 
required to “commence or implement an undertaking in Ghana” (Ghanaian 
Environmental Protection Agency: 2).  When the Environmental Permit is followed 
during the undertaking, an Environmental Certificate is granted to that party.   
Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) are required for “implementation(s) or 
development(s) (that) may have significant impact”.  Relevant information must be 
gathered and analyzed to realize potential consequences, mitigations and alternatives that 
should be considered “to ensure environmentally sound and sustainable implementation 
or development”.  These are publicly available and required to be as comprehensible as 
possible (Parker 2011). 
 
Forest Plantation Development Fund 
The Forest Plantation Development Fund Act of 2000, which superseded Forest 
Improvement Fund Act (1960) and its 1962 amendment (Amoako-Nuama 1999: 25), 
creates a fund to assist in the development of private commercial forest plantations 
(Forestry Commission of Ghana 2000).  This is to develop forest plantations on lands that 
are suitable for commercial timber production and to promote research and technical 
development in commercial forestry endeavors.  Funding for this program is provided by 
the 1974 Trees and Timber Decree (via the timber export levy, subject to its 1994 
amendments), grants//loans, and parliamentary funding (Forestry Commission of Ghana 
2000, Amoako-Nuama 1999: 25).  A Fund Management Board (comprised of private 
sector, governmental, and donating parties) is required to create a “private sector forest 
plantation development scheme” that includes 200,000 or fewer hectares of land for a 
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period between 10 and 25 years.  Forest plantation inspectors are permitted to visit 
beneficiary plantations at any time (Forestry Commission of Ghana 2000).   
 
Replanting 
The National Forestry Development Programme, which was enacted by the 
President in 2001, aims to replant 20,000 hectares of forest annually (Benneh 2011).   
This relies upon private sector participation (Forestry and Agriculture Organization 2008: 
1).   
 
Absence of data 
Data collected by different environmental agencies is often "guarded rather 
jealously" at the expense of efficiency and knowledge transmission.  Many of Ghana's 
environmental statistics are kept from the public and other agencies (with few 
exceptions).  International organizations provide much of the available environmental 
information.  Data are collected inconsistently, preventing trend observations.  In 
addition, most people are unwilling to provide information, “feeling that the data 
collector will use it for a personal financial or prestigious gain so he should pay 
something for what he wants to collect".  Fear of job loss and disapproval by one's 
superiors also discourages provision of information (United Nations 2005: 2-4, 6-7) 
 
Implementation failures 
Although recent policies appear to protect Ghana’s forests, they are not actually 
implemented.  During 2002 and after, the Forestry Commission and commercial loggers 
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“simply ignored access restrictions and fiscal measures with impunity”.  And in certain 
communities, “the state has lost control” over the forestry reserves: there are armed 
communities willing “to confront Forestry Commission officials, police, and military to 
protect illegal farming activities” (Forest Watch Ghana 2006: 17).  Though there is a 
provision for “Social Responsibility Agreements” that allocate five percent of timber 
companies’ stumpage obligations to support social projects in the companies affected by 
their operations, performance cannot be monitored; the communities are unaware of the 
stumpage obligations (Appiah 1999).  However, new legislation provided farmers the 
right to allow or prevent Timber Utilisation Contract holders from felling trees on their 
properties.    
 Only six out of over 600 active timber concession holders registered to pay timber 
rights fees.   These were mandatory, starting in September 1998, under the Timber 
Resources Management Act.  The Ministry of Lands, Forestry and Mines and the 
Forestry Commission never enforced the permit policy, since industry opposes it and “it 
involved a redistribution of resource rent” (Forest Watch Ghana 2006: 12).  In addition to 
shaping forestry policies and regulations, large logging operations “systematically violate 
permit regulations with complete impunity” (Forest Watch Ghana 2006: 9).  This logging 
industry subsidy costs the government at least $100 million US per year (Forest Watch 
Ghana 2006: 12). 
 The 1998 Timber Resources Management Regulations (LI 1649) created “Timber 
Utilization Permits” (TUPs) to allow communities, District Assemblies, and NGOs to use 
trees for non-commercial use.  However, the regulations outlining these permits are 
vague, and communities have been unable to use these permits.  Instead, the Forestry 
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Commission uses the permits to provide commercial loggers discounted timber; the 
Forestry Commission issued 125 TUPs to large logging companies between 2001 and 
2003 (Forest Watch Ghana 2006: 11).  Practically all regulations apply only to rural 
communities, who have little clout.   
Furthermore, the Large Taxpayers Office of the Internal Revenue Service 
reported that the majority of large logging companies have been registered as “free zone 
enterprises” under the Ghana Free Zone Board Act since 2001.  This entails a ten-year tax 
holiday in lieu of the 30 percent corporate income tax that should apply (Forest Watch 
Ghana 2006: 13).   
 
Elimination of Timber Utilisation Contracts 
In 2002, the Cabinet approved of the previous government’s recommendations to 
revoke Timber Utilisation Contracts, replacing them with competitive bidding (Ghana 
News Agency 2002).  This is consistent with the 2002 Timber Resources Management 
Act (617), which provides “legal basis for competitive bidding” (African Development 
Bank Group 2010). 
 
Stricter penalties 
The 2002 Amendment of the Forest Protection Act increased penalties for forestry 
offenses; fines were increased, and joint liability was introduced.  The Community 
Forestry Management Project (2003) has four components: integrated forest 
management, sustainable livelihood improvement, “capacity building and institutional 
strengthening”, and “project management support” (African Development Bank Group 
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2010).  The project’s aim is to relieve poverty through sustainable forestry development 
(via strengthened institutions and increased agricultural and forestry production, coupled 
with rehabilitation of damaged reserves).  Collaborative forestry management is a 
proposed tool.  “Smallholders” living near the reserves are expected to plant trees and 
produce food crops, which would likely increase their incomes.  Establishing 
communities’ long-term interest in the trees’ performance is crucial for this to work.  
This is also created to narrow the gap between supply and demand of wood in domestic 
markets to decrease timber imports.   This is funded by the African Development Bank 
and aims to rehabilitate six degraded reserves (Forestry Commission of Ghana 2010a).   
The Timber Resources Management Regulations were amended in 2003 to 
include competitive bidding for timber rights (after passing through a pre-qualification 
process) (Forestry Commission of Ghana 2003). 
 
Development of a certification system 
The Forestry Commission began to develop a Forest Management Certification 
System and a computerized tracking system, under the Validation of Legal Timber 
Programme.  The objective of this was to verify the legal origin of timber for exportation, 
“to secure a bigger and sustainable share of the market through the promotion of verified 
legal timber products, and thereby seek the support of the EU to offer sufficient 
incentives to the Ghanaian industry to ensure adherence to the licensing scheme” 
(GhanaWeb 2005).  Ghana exports approximately 60 percent of its wood to the European 
Union, and the most profitable contracts are through EU customers (Forest Watch Ghana 
2006: 26).  Therefore, logging companies have sufficient incentives to comply with the 
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Programme.  This would place Ghana on track to certify timber exports to the European 
Union in accordance with a Voluntary Partnership Agreement.  The Programme is 
completely funded by the Ghanaian government, with Société Generale providing 
technical assistance (GhanaWeb 2005).   
 
 Land and taxation policies encourage deforestation  
Property can be held by a family for 90 years before ownership is revoked.  If 
there is a property ownership disagreement following a division, the land reverts back to 
the original owners (Ansah 2010).  The government occasionally “forcefully obtain(s) 
land” from communities to create forestry reserves (Forestry Commission of Ghana 
2000).  Hence, there is not a strong sense of property security.  There is an incentive to 
develop land as quickly as possible to place one’s stake on it (Ansah 2010): “with few or 
no rights in the reserves, nearby farmers and communities have had no incentives to 
protect, manage, or invest in the resource.” (Forestry Commission of Ghana 2000).  
However, this does not guarantee anything and is often wasteful.  Taxation also 
encourages agricultural development: the only items that can be imported duty-free are 
agricultural implements of any type (including tractors) and musical instruments.  In 
addition, self-employed individuals (such as farmers) are not subject to income taxation 
(Ansah 2010).   
 
Conclusion 
Ghanaian forestry policy has strictly controlled small-scale forestry operations by 
rural communities with low ecological impacts.  In regard to small-scaled operations, 
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“the provision of draconian punishments for the smallest infringement of forest use 
restrictions has been the most consistent feature of forestry legislation through the years” 
(Forest Watch Ghana 2006: 10).  Large loggers operate unchecked, and illegal chainsaw 
cutting is a major source of timber.  In regards to ecological and rural livelihood 
considerations, the policies are often “unbalanced like elephants and ants on cee-saws” 
(Genius/GZA 1995).   
The corporate sector therefore plays a large role in policymaking and 
unsustainably obtains the vast majority of resources with impunity, at the expense of rural 
communities.  Corruption of the industry and government is a major problem.  In order to 
make any progress, major policy reform and improved implementation to foster 
sustainable practices and fair access to resources is detrimental: “NGOs are not set up to 
take on what is essentially a political challenge” (Forest Watch Ghana 2006: 25).  Rapid 
resource depletion and population growth place increased economic and environmental 
strains on Ghana: time is of the essence in crafting viable policy.  There are some 
concerns about extreme violence, similar to that of Sierra Leone and Cote d’Ivoire (which 
were peaceful until a sudden collapse).  Ethnic tensions have been increasing, and 
“warlords very quickly link up with (or become) natural resource plunderers” (Forest 
Watch Ghana 2006: 25). 
There is a high degree of official leniency; forestry “reserves” are multi-purposed 
and can be legally logged, and policy promotes increased exploitation of forestry 
resources with only rehabilitation of degraded resources to mitigate for the negative 
ecological impacts.  The incentives provided by the policies and extremely limited 
enforcement do not yet encourage sustainable development, although that was more of a 
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concern in recent policy.   However, forestry policy has not been significantly updated 
since the 1994 Forest and Wildlife Policy.   
 Future policy should not repress rural populations; as evidenced by previous 
initiatives, overly stringent measures only cause communities to blatantly disregard them 
or rebel in order to support their basic needs.  Many policies do not attack the real 
problem (industry) and would provide insurmountable economic barriers were they to be 
followed.  Great potential exists in “participatory” development that provides the 
communities with some control and community modernization (using the resources they 
have) (Forest Watch Ghana 2006: 17).  However, funding effective and sustainable 
forestry policy remains a challenge: “It's hard to be legit and still pay tha rent” (Tupac 
1993).   
Agricultural policy has had the same history of slow improvement, peppered with 
a few major failures.  As with forestry policy, there still remains much room for 
improvement, particularly in implementation.  
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Chapter 4: Agricultural Practices and Policies4           
 
           As the dominant economic sector with great cultural significance, agriculture is a 
vital component of Ghana’s livelihood.  Approximately 60 percent of Ghana’s workforce 
operates in the agricultural and forestry sector, with 64 percent of Ghana’s wealth in crop 
lands.  Most of Ghana’s poor live in rural areas and are food crop farmers; “any 
intervention in agriculture… can have (a) profound effect on poverty alleviation among 
the rural” (Asuming-Brempong 2003).  Agriculture has a unique ability to provide social 
stabilization, buffer shocks in the economy against deterioration in living standards, 
improve environmental sustainability, and foster cultural values.   However, lack of 
financial adaptability from the predominant “hand-to-mouth” form of livelihood leaves 
many vulnerable to fluctuations in economic and weather conditions and with practically 
no room to respond.  Because of its deep-rooted dependence upon agriculture, which is 
experiencing steady declines in both land availability and productivity (due to limited 
access to proper inputs), Ghana is in a precarious situation, although the vast majority of 
the population enjoys relative economic prosperity now. 
            Agricultural productivity is largely based upon the natural resources available to 
the region.  Improper use of shifting cultivation and diminishing forest cover put Ghana 
at risk; 69 percent of its total land surface area is “prone to severe erosion”; this reduces 
annual GDP by two percent (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 61).  Overgrazing 
increases the problem; much of the lands are communal and lack designated livestock 
                                                 
4 Unless otherwise noted, the information in Chapter 4 is based upon: Ministry of Food and Agriculture. 
Food and Agriculture Sector Development Policy (FASDEP II): Republic of Ghana, 2007. 
www.mofa.gov.gh/FASDEP%20II. 
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grazing areas, so large swaths are prone to erosion.  Use of agricultural technologies is 
extremely limited, with the brunt of production being entirely dependent upon rainfall.  
Less than 1 percent of arable land is irrigated; the cost of irrigation is prohibitive 
(Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2007: 18).  Because of the weather dependency of 
food crops, yields of roots, tubers, and vegetables widely oscillate between scarcity and 
surplus.   Much of the arable land has minimal organic content and is not well-suited for 
farming (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2007: 12).  Poor infrastructure, lack of credit, 
minimal access to technology, and limited energy availability further hamper incentives 
to participate in the agricultural sector and improve existing practices, particularly in the 
realm of environmental and economic sustainability.   
            The Northern Region, which is semiarid, has the greatest need for irrigation.  
However, these lands are comprised of voltaic sandstone, which has low fertility and 
water capacity, limiting agricultural potential (Pleasant Valley Conservancy 2009: 1).  
Because there is limited ground water capacity, dams would be the primary means of 
irrigation infrastructure (Kuyini 2005: 1).  The Kpong Irrigation Project (which was 
completed in December 2003), which distributes water from the Kpong Dam through 
canals, has caused water tables to rise (MASDAR 2009).  This, along with increased 
agricultural activity, has increased erosion, soil salinity, and human exposure to 
agrochemicals (African Development Fund 2005).  However, the Agricultural 
Development Bank has cut funding, due to poor governmental planning (Ghanaian 
Chronicle 2001). 
            However, officials of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MoFA) believe 
irrigation should be increased, as there exists a “well-endowed network of water bodies 
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which can be tapped for irrigation” (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2007: 21).   This is 
the same extractive and destructive mentality that has harmed the forestry sector.  
Agriculture should not be dependent upon irrigation, and lack of it does not permanently 
damage the soil, unlike fertilizers, which improve soil quality, increase sustainability, and 
augment crop yields.    
            Ghanaian agriculture is inefficient, due to limited access to inputs (because of 
limitations in both credit and affordability), land property-owning systems that hamper 
ability to invest, poor soil conditions, erratic precipitation, disease, pests, and poor breeds 
(of both plants and livestock).  Lack of knowledge regarding “post-harvest management”, 
especially of perishable produce has caused extensive post-harvest losses of up to 50 
percent of yields.   Traditional processing methods are most commonly used but tend to 
have low yields of poorer quality (but the exact opposite is true of palm oil).  
Poor infrastructure increases the costs of agricultural inputs like fertilizer.  And in 
spite of its comparative advantage in horticultural crops, such as pineapple, Ghana is less 
competitive to Latin American, East Asian, and neighboring countries.  This has been 
primarily attributed to poor infrastructure, high capital costs, lack of irrigation, poor 
quality control, and insufficient management of logistics.    
             Gender inequality problems are largely intertwined with agricultural practices, in 
regard to both human rights and overall economic efficiency considerations.  Lack of 
feeder roads between farms and villages require manual transportation of produce, and 
this is predominantly the women’s duty.  Women are also responsible for the majority of 
household responsibilities, marketing, and agricultural work, culminating in a “triple 
workload”.  Even women whose livelihoods are connected with families conduct a large 
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share of agricultural work.  Men tend to migrate to the cities for work and send home 
money to support their families, while the women conduct all of the household 
responsibilities and agricultural work.  In addition, female access to land and capital is 
limited because of “cultural and institutional factors”; for example, lack of legal 
ownership over tangible assets translates into incapacity to possess collateral for 
obtaining credit.  Furthermore, extension services largely ignore women, as the extension 
agents do not consider them legitimate farmers.  Therefore, a large number of households 
are completely neglected by extension services, and fewer than 20 percent of extension 
services reach women.  These extension services are vital, as they also play a key role in 
improving food safety.    
            Due to low literacy among farmers, dissemination of information is hampered.   A 
disproportionately higher prevalence of poverty within the agricultural sector also limits 
new practice adoption, as lack of economic viability limits purchasing power and 
increases risk-aversion.  Approximately 80 percent of Ghana’s total agricultural output is 
produced by subsistence farms that use minimal forms of technology, and 90 percent of 
agricultural holdings are less than two hectares.  Many agricultural producers do not 
recognize the relationship between the health of the environment and agricultural 
productivity.    
Although modern Ghana as a whole has enjoyed food security, there are segments 
of the population that lack this in all regions: “for most households, hunger is frequently 
associated with poor harvests resulting from environmental degradation, poor weather, 
natural disasters, or conflict.  Almost all families supplement their food requirements 
with significant amounts of purchased staple crops”.  Malnutrition is most problematic 
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for children, adolescents and pregnant women, due to insufficient levels of food intake 
and/or diets lacking proper levels of nutrients.  Malnutrition contributes to 40 percent of 
childhood mortality.  Seven percent of children are “wasted” due to acute malnutrition, 
down two percent from 1998.  There are 11 times more underweight children than in a 
typical well-nourished population. 
 Limited collateral vastly diminishes credit, due to minimal value assets and lack 
of official ownership by women (whose impact on the sector is enormous) and other 
economically disadvantaged actors.  Additionally, interest rates are high, and financiers 
view agriculture as a risky sector.  The ADB, which primarily loans to large traders, 
farmers, and processing units, provided but 28 percent of the total demand for credit in 
the agricultural sector in 2006.    
 Many policies are still based upon the pre-independence structure.  Many policies 
are based upon repeated mistakes, some upon successful endeavors, and a few are 
experiments.  Because governmental interventions in the cocoa subsector, as in providing 
vital agricultural inputs, have been successful in reducing poverty within that arena, these 
form the basis for initiatives of the second Food and Agricultural Sector Development 
Policy.    
 
Colonial Policy 
Before Ghana became independent from Britain, agricultural policy created by the 
colonial rule bolstered food and raw material production for the Empire’s benefit.  The 
Gold Coast was expected to provide Europe with raw inputs to be processed abroad.  A 
poll tax law passed in the early 1900s further encouraged most sustenance farmers to 
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produce cash crops, especially cocoa (Girdner et al 1980: 14-25).  Several governmental 
programs were implemented to promote cash crop production (in particular, oil palm and 
cocoa) and agricultural development in general, such as the 1919 Ten-Year Development 
Plan. To increase efficiency within the agricultural sector, the colonial government 
developed a road and railway infrastructure, particularly in the South (Asuming-
Brempong 2003).  Unlike many of its neighbors, Ghana fortunately did not face “large-
scale land alienation and harsh labour codes” (Girdner et al 1980: 14-25).  Plantations 
were also not as common in Ghana, due to a belief of increased resiliency in small-scale 
agricultural operations (World Rainforest Movement 2010). 
However, colonial influences discouraged “subsistence economic activities” in 
the Gold Coast (Ghana) so that the colony would be profitable to Britain in exporting to it 
minerals, cash crops, and timber.  “Extractive industries” faced low taxation, and 
agricultural products grown by the rural poor were sold below their true value.  Most of 
the profits were retained by European companies, and much of what remained in the 
Gold Coast paid the colonial administration (Forest Watch Ghana 2006: 19). 
             It was not until 1946 that another 10-Year Development Plan was penned for the 
then Gold Coast (Asuming-Brempong 2003).  A few similar plans were implemented 
until the Nkrumah administration modeled a new plan based on Eastern European 
countries following independence.    
 
Cocoa   
Poorly designed policies have had detrimental effects on Ghana’s single-most 
important industry, cocoa.  Over-reaching policies have greatly hampered cocoa 
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production.  It is also epitomizes Ghana’s sacrifice of food crops for export crops.  The 
majority of the Ghanaian government’s funding was solely derived from cocoa, the 
nation’s bumper crop (Ascher 1999: 1-279).  The repercussions of heavy taxation on the 
most economically successful industry in Ghana were widespread.  However, there have 
been a few successful policies, such as governmental provision (and subsidization) of 
agricultural inputs, such as pest and disease protection for the crops. 
The Gold Coast Cocoa Marketing Board, also known as COCOBOD, was 
officially established in 1947 (COCOBOD 2010).  Though COCOBOD’s ostensible 
purpose was to improve cocoa production infrastructure, rehabilitate farms, improve 
harbor infrastructure, conduct research, and prevent crop disease, it soon became highly 
politicized by the dominant Convention People’s Party (CPP) in the 1950s.  All non-
governmental cocoa purchasing companies were banned, and a state agency—the United 
Ghana Farmers’ Council Cooperatives, or UGFCC—was created to exercise complete 
control over cocoa cooperatives.  The UGFCC “had both a political and an economic 
monopoly”.  Since the UGFCC and state-run Cocoa Board were extremely powerful and 
implemented a variety of activities (such as taxation, purchasing cocoa, making loans, 
running cocoa cooperatives, providing technical assistance and crop disease treatment, 
operating health centers, providing scholarships, and supporting the University College), 
there was no accountability in fund allocations to the “producing areas” (Ascher 1999: 1-
279).  COCOBOD’s internal marketing monopoly also prevents marketing efficiency via 
competing buyers that would improve producer prices. 
A large gap between cocoa export and farmgate prices developed as revenues 
were allocated to general governmental funds; “public cocoa income” comprised 60 
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percent of export sales in 1953-4.   In addition, Cocoa Board reserves were made 
available for loans and grants unrelated to cocoa production and/or marketing.  A 1954 
ordinance allocated  40 percent of the funds to finance the national development plan, 40 
percent to fund large-scale projects beyond the national development plan’s scope, and 
20 percent was given to the central treasury (Ascher 1999: 1-279).   
Cocoa taxation was also structured to encourage urban development and 
discourage agriculture, though cocoa production was and remains the staple of Ghana’s 
economy.  Unity within the CPP, which was pro-industry, enabled this gross exploitation 
of the cocoa industry.  “Ghana’s most precious export commodity” was likely put at such 
risk because of low expected political and other retaliation from the cocoa industry, 
desire to industrialize the economy, and ease of obtaining cocoa surpluses.  Taxing 
agriculture for “self-reliance” led to “agricultural decline and inefficient industry” 
(Ascher 1999: 1-279).   
Taxation was so high that between 1975 and 1985, producers often received less 
than ten percent of the world market price.  Coupled with plummeting world prices, 
cocoa production drastically declined.  The combination of decreased production of 
Ghana’s single greatest source of revenue with high inflation culminated an economic 
crisis in the 1980s (Ascher 1999: 1-279).  And though cocoa comprised 14 percent of 
national GDP in 1970, this figure declined to 3.5 percent in 1980 and further to 2.6 
percent in 1982 (Asuming-Brempong 2003).   
Fortunately for cocoa producers, as a condition for IMF and World Bank funds, 
the government agreed (in part with other reforms) to raise cocoa producer prices in 1983 
(Ascher 1999: 1-279).  Cocoa output eventually increased, aided by devaluation of the 
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Cedi.  Government programs that “mass spray cocoa farms” to protect the crops from 
pests and disease and higher nominal producer prices have also augmented production 
(Asuming-Brempong 2003).   However, only industrial tree crops (like cocoa, coffee, and 
oil palm) were assisted by the government (US Library of Congress 2011).  
            The 1988-9 Cocoa Rehabilitation Project (CRP) was a result of the 1983 ERP, 
which pushed stabilization and structural reform.  The CRP was the first cocoa project in 
Ghana to be funded by the Agricultural Development Bank.  Stated objectives of the CRP 
were: increased cocoa production, augmenting foreign exchange earnings from cocoa 
exportation, and reduced rural poverty.  The project took ten years to implement instead 
of the intended five.  Due to an improved producer price, hybrid seed availability, and 
governmental disease/pest control, the CRP was successful in increasing cocoa 
production (African Development Bank 2002).   
Eventually, governmental control of cocoa production in general decreased 
drastically.  The Ghana National Association of Farmers and Fishermen was established 
in 1991, in place of the Ghana Federation of Agricultural Cooperatives.  Funding from 
the farmers was expected to run this cooperative in place of governmental sponsorship.  
The lack of financial support from the government put farmers in a hard position (U.S. 
Library of Congress 2011).   
            In addition, the Cocoa Marketing Board’s control over pricing and marketing 
eventually declined (U.S. Library of Congress 2011).  Two new buyers (Universal Crop 
Production Limited and Cashew and Spices Products) were licensed to buy cocoa in 1992 
(in addition to the Produce Buying Company, which is one of COCOBOD’s 
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subsidiaries).  Even more cocoa buying agencies have been licensed recently (Asuming-
Brempong 2003).   
Cocoa prices have increased by about three times since 2001.  The second Food 
and Agriculture Sector Development Plan aims to increase the amount locally-processed 
cocoa from 20 percent in 2002 to 40-50 percent in 2007.  This is incredibly optimistic, 
and as seen by the forestry sector, extreme optimism may not be the best approach.  
Sometimes processing does not actually increase profits, due to high levels of waste.    
 
Post-Independence  
Socialism 
The post-independence government, led by Kwame Nkrumah, was heavily 
influenced by Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.  It created 1,089 state and 
cooperative farms from 1961 until it was overthrown in 1966.  The Agricultural 
Development Corporation and State Farm Workers Brigade and Farmers' Co-operative 
were established in 1963 to modernize and increase the national scale of agricultural 
endeavors (Asuming-Brempong 2003).  However, the performance under this socialist 
system was poor.    
Price controls were introduced with “quantitative import restrictions” that began 
in 1962.  The government’s aim was to decrease inflation and protect the consumer, 
preventing both importers and domestic manufacturers from “earning monopoly rents”.  
Items included imported consumer goods and domestically produced good with “high 
import content”.  The price controls, however, did not extend to most local food products 
(Killick 1973: 405-26).  Maximum prices were set for manufactured goods and minimum 
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prices for “major agricultural commodities” such as cocoa, corn and rice (Asuming-
Brempong 2003).   
However, price controls are only effective when conditions enable there to be 
“large monopoly profits”.  Corruption also prevented improved enforcement that would 
have made the price controls more effective.  Hence, the controls were mostly ignored, 
especially in urban markets and rural areas as a whole.  Only urban shops, which have 
predominantly elite clientele, abided by this policy.  Hence, the inequalities in living 
standards were only broadened, as the elite reaped the benefits of discounted goods 
(Killick 1973: 405-26).  The price controls only exacerbated the existing problems of 
scarcity and inflation, as the amount of imports was drastically limited and governmental 
spending increased (Meier and Steel 1989). 
State-run large-scaled operations, such as State Farms and the Food-Production 
Corporation “have been notoriously inefficient” (Girdner et al 1980: 14-25).  These farms 
were most dominant for five years during the 1960s.  Though the governments supported 
large-scale farms since the 1950s, state farms only began to be majorly implemented in 
1962, following a recent plummet in world cocoa prices and foreign exchange shortfalls 
that reduced imports in raw materials and food (Miracle and Seidman 1968: 3-50).   
The State Farms Corporation (SFC) began operations in June of 1962 (though it 
was not officially established until the following January).  Its purpose was to expand 
agricultural production, at which the government felt that the traditional sector was 
failing (Miracle and Seidman 1968: 3-50).   
The 1963-4 Seven-Year Development Plan aimed to increase basic food crop 
production, expand crops into “uncultivated” areas (to put “idle land resources…to 
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productive use”), and boost export crop and meat production.  In eagerness to dominate 
the land and produce, many valuable resources were wasted.  Though these data vary 
widely, of Ghana’s approximate million acres of agricultural lands, it has been estimated 
that state farms held roughly 250,000 acres, 203,000 of which were cleared, with only 
99,000 cultivated (1965) (Miracle and Seidman 1968: 3-50).   
 Some organizations, such as the state-run Workers’ Brigade (which contained 
many unemployed citizens who were paid to work the farms), worked in concert with 
state farm productions; the Brigade grew roughly 13 percent of State Farms’ crops.  
However, many Brigade workers and camps were “fictitious”, with its supervisors 
pocketing the money (Miracle and Seidman 1968: 3-50).   
 In 1967, the SFC created several processing mills.  However, it lacked adequate 
staffing, in regards to both competency and number of employees.  Resources were set 
aside for the workers to live on the farms, but the vast majority chose to remain in their 
villages.  Use of mechanized equipment was limited, due to inadequate training and risk 
of erosion (with the clearing of large swaths of land).  Regardless of the inefficiencies, 
the production targets were very optimistic, and during the State Farms’ lives, there was 
always a great disparity between these and the actual results.  Due to large expenditures, 
such as for unused machinery and supplies to encourage living on the farms, coupled 
with small returns, the SFC posted of a loss of approximately $4 million in 1964, $7 in 
1965, and $9 million in 1966 (Miracle and Seidman 1968: 3-50).   
The 1964 Sever-Year Plan focused on industrialization, with the ambitious goal of 
an 83 percent increase in industrial output by 1970.    Import substitution was another 
focus of the policy, as was the creation of a processing industry for raw agricultural and 
58 
 
mining products.  The plan’s aim was to focus on a few commodities and apply more 
advanced forms of agricultural and technical knowledge because of that specialization.   
The commodities were chosen based on nutritional benefits (i.e. cereals and fish) and/or 
the ability to solve Ghana's trade deficit (i.e. sugar and cocoa).  Extension services by the 
government were used to augment agricultural development (Asuming-Brempong 2003).  
This socialist approach to administration diverged from the colonial 
administrative strategy.  State enterprises were established to support economic 
development and industrialization.  Various other policies were implemented for the 
same reason, including internal price controls, establishing a minimum wage, controlling 
the interest rate, over-valuing the exchange rate, and providing free importation of capital 
equipment to promote industry and use of technology.  The creation of farming 
cooperatives was encouraged, as this was thought to increase access to machinery and 
modern agricultural techniques.  The Seven Year Development Plan was scrapped just 
two years later with the 1966 coup, and the military and civilian governments that 
followed created their own 2-Year and 1-Year Development Plans (Asuming-Brempong 
2003).   
 
Economic liberalization 
Because Ghana’s economy has been highly dependent upon agriculture, most 
regimes were empowered or overthrown because of their agricultural platforms.  
Discontent related to rising food prices and lack of imported raw materials that limited 
both agricultural and industrial operations were major reasons for Nkrumah’s upset 
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(Miracle and Seidman 1968: 3-50).  The plans following the 1966 coup promoted liberal 
economic policies and development of the private sector (Asuming-Brempong 2003).   
The National Liberation Council government that claimed control in 1966 focused 
on economic stabilization by pushing a “market-oriented” economy.  “Stringent 
stabilization measures” were taken by minimizing gross national expenditure, liberalizing 
trade, devaluing the Cedi (most major in 1971), and cutting public capital expenditures.  
Several state-owned companies were sold to the private sector, and others were re-
organized under the Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation, starting in 1968.  Import 
licensing and ceilings were cut, and export subsidies for crops other than cocoa were 
initiated (Asuming-Brempong 2003).   
The overly optimistic import substitution strategy of the 1960s was funded by 
increasing the money supply, although a major budget deficit already existed.  The 
capitalist military and following civilian governments that controlled Ghana after 
Nkrumah’s 1966 overthrow completely abandoned this, but import tariffs were low and 
the balance of payments problem remained.  To solve this problem, the Cedi was 
devalued to increase exports.  In addition, single commodity development boards were 
established to aid subsistence farming efforts (Asuming-Brempong 2003).   
 
Re-introduction of restrictive polices 
The Agricultural Development Bank was established in 1968 to provide credit for 
funding agricultural improvements.  The government also improved the infrastructure in 
rural areas to encourage rural inhabitance.  However, the next government and others 
during the political turmoil of the 1970s completely reversed economic policy again, 
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overvalued the Cedi, and re-implemented price controls. This caused per capita income to 
plummet by 40 percent.  Agricultural production decreased from the 1960s until the 
Economic Reform Policy/Structural Adjustment Program (ERP/SAP) of 1983 was 
adopted (Asuming-Brempong 2003).   
The decline was due in part to poor economic policies and weather conditions.  
Commodity prices greatly dropped during the late 1960s, and infrastructure and 
governmental services in general have been inadequate since.  This problem is compacted 
by limited access to agricultural inputs, which have not been subsidized since the 1983 
ERP.  Consequently, the “food self-sufficiency ratio” fell from 83 percent between 1961 
and 1966 to 71 percent in the period 1978-80; food imports quadrupled during the 1972-
82 period.  Drought caused food shortages and decreased export crop production (U.S. 
Library of Congress 2011).  
Because the desired results from the import restrictions and price controls did not 
come to fruition, just before the 1972 military coup, the government drastically reduced 
the number of products previously included in the controls.  However, the new military 
government re-expanded the number of items subject to import restrictions (Killick 1973: 
405-26).  
Food shortages sparked the overthrow of the democratic government in 1972 by a 
military regime that created and implemented the Operation Feed Yourself (OFY) policy 
that same year.  Although food production was actually declining, OFY called for 
“national self-reliance based on increased food production”.  The agricultural growth rate 
was only 2.6 percent between 1969 and 1972, but the targeted growth rate under the 
policy (to begin in 1973) was unrealistically set at six percent (Girdner et al 1980: 14-25).  
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Adverse weather conditions widened the disparity between the amount that the farmers 
were able to produce and that which the government had expected (Asuming-Brempong 
2003).  A food shortage obviously resulted and the price of food subsequently 
skyrocketed (Girdner et al 1980: 14-25).  These, joined with plummeting mining and 
timber operations, lead to the economy’s drastic decline between 1972 and 1982.  The 
economy’s failure and high previously-accumulated deficits prompted the government to 
borrow large sums of money.  The government then expanded the money supply, which 
caused inflation to soar from nine percent in 1970 to 123 percent in 1983 (Asuming-
Brempong 2003).   
In a desperate attempt to increase the supply of food, Operation Feed Yourself 
encouraged the Ministry of Agriculture, state-run agricultural corporations and 
agricultural boards, schools, colleges, prisons, the armed forces, private corporations and 
individual citizens to engage in agricultural production.  The Ministry of Agriculture also 
pushed production of the most efficient crops on a regional basis (Girdner et al 1980: 14-
25).   
However, farmers were only granted Agricultural Development Bank loans if 
land ownership was documented properly.  This practice continues.  Since most land is 
communally owned, with land granted by the local chief, this policy is problematic for a 
typical small-scale farmer. It is difficult to use undocumented communal lands as 
mortgage collateral.  In addition, land registration for loans must also be done in Accra; 
due to transportation limitations, this is not feasible for many communities.   The 
administrative process itself is flawed as well; “delays and mix-ups” are common.  If a 
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farmer somehow is able to successfully complete the application process, s/he typically 
does not actually receive the loan until one to two years later (Girdner et al 1980: 14-25).   
Expansion of state-run agricultural activities was pushed once more via OFY.  
However, repayment of debts (to the Agricultural Development Bank, founded in 1965) 
by State Farms and the Food Production Corporation continued to be poor, and funds 
were not used as intended; they were often spent on “payment of old debts, personal 
allowances, salaries, and the acquisition of capital items not having any immediate 
bearing on production”.  The government did not publicize annual yields information, 
and food shortages were common, evidencing the large-scaled operations failures 
(Girdner et al 1980: 14-25). 
The recurring theme of limited cooperation among state agencies was fortunate in 
this instance.  The wasteful State Farms operations died out, in part due to the 
Agricultural Development Bank discontinuing OFY corporation funds as of 1975.  But 
failing large enterprises continued to receive the majority of governmental aid while 
neglect of small farming operations remained (Girdner et al 1980: 14-25).   
            The ADB is notorious for holding overly stringent standards for loans to farmers.  
This is partly due to the astronomical losses to the Bank from State Farms.  The ADB 
was forced to take this measure to protect itself from collapsing, but the lack of funding 
available to sustenance operations impedes agricultural efficiency.  Since the government 
had promised financial aid, difficulty in receiving loans diminished faith in the 
government.  In addition, the Extension Service and similar organizations that were given 
the responsibility of implementing OFY did not act in a manner that impacted the food 
producers (Girdner et al 1980: 14-25). 
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A 1980 article by the IPC Business Press stated: “until quite recently, few 
attempts at eradicating the problems inherent to a mono-crop economy had been made by 
modern Ghanaian governments”.  In addition to extensive governmental funding, export 
crop producers (predominantly large-scale cocoa farmers) have received basically all 
benefits of agricultural research, such as improved seeds, pest control, and improved 
production techniques (Girdner et al 1980: 14-25).   
In 1977, plantations were created with joint ownership between the government 
and private sector (both domestic and foreign).  Two of the three major oil palm 
plantations created had joint private and governmental ownership, and the third (GOPDC, 
which was divested in 1995) was owned by the state but given foreign assistance (World 
Rainforest Movement 2010).  Following the 1981 coup, many similar operations 
proliferated due to governmental support.   
The regime that assumed power in December of 1981 immediately reduced the 
amount at which the Cedi was devalued from 78.2 percent to 25 percent.  The 
government played an even stronger role in agriculture, as was apparent with the 
reintroduction of import licensing (which are non-tariff trade barriers), price controls, and 
the import substitution strategy.  Consequently, engagement in black market activities 
soared.  Inefficiency, overstaffing, fraudulent allocation of public funds, and poor 
accounting practices by the public sector were also problematic.  Falling world cocoa 
prices and once again, adverse weather conditions placed additional strain on the national 
economy (Asuming-Brempong 2003).     
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Crisis 
By 1983, the economic decline was unrivalled (Asuming-Brempong 2003).  Due 
to scarcity, locally produced foods in 1980 were more expensive than imported 
equivalents.  The consumer index, based upon year 1963, reached 226.7 (and 259.4 for 
the local food index) in 1972, but in 1977 was a whopping 1,729.2 (2,677.8 for the local 
food index) (Girdner et al 1980: 14-25).  Food self-sufficiency was 83 percent between 
1964 and 1966 but only 60 percent in 1982, although the economy was impaired mostly 
due to failed attempts to reduce dependence.  The deficit soared as total public 
expenditure outpaced government revenue by 65 percent (Asuming-Brempong 2003).   
 
Gradually returning to economic liberalization 
            Though subsidization of agricultural inputs (such as fertilizer and other 
agrochemicals) created “bottlenecks” in their availability, the gradual removal of those 
subsidies (via the ERP and SAP)—though meant to improve efficiency—may have been 
more detrimental.  The costs of these inputs became entirely prohibitive, which has led to 
soil depletion and subsequent diminished agricultural productivity.  However, 
agricultural investments were prioritized, with loans and grants as the primary means for 
such (U.S. Library of Congress 2011).  In addition, the Cedi’s exchange rate was 
realigned (Asuming-Brempong 2003). 
            Reforms in 1983 limited governmental involvement in production, distribution, 
and marketing, both of inputs and products (Khor 2006).  Guaranteed prices for corn and 
rice were cut, and imports were then allowed to compete with domestically produced 
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items.  However, cocoa continued to have a guaranteed price, since it is so vital to 
Ghana’s economy (Asuming-Brempong 2003).   
 But as with OFY, the policy failed; all major foods (except yams) experienced 
higher price instability during the post-liberalization era than before the so-called reforms 
(Asuming-Brempong 2003).  In addition, subsidy removal of agricultural inputs hindered 
the Ghanaian farmers’ capabilities to compete with cheaper imports supported by other 
governments’ subsidies on inputs.  Hence, several industries failed, such as rice, poultry, 
oil palm, and cotton production.   
 Basically all palm oil is hand-processed in villages by women.  The only inputs 
are water, a large pestle, fire, and human labor.  The remaining palm nuts and fibers are 
re-used, so this is a very efficient method.  In addition, hand-produced palm oil is 
strongly preferred by consumers, due to its higher quality. However, industrial oil palm 
production is being promoted by the government now, mostly due to its use as a biofuel 
(World Rainforest Movement 2010).   
         Agricultural production declined until the Economic Recovery Programme 
(ERP)/Social Adjustment Programme (SAP) of 1983 was adopted (Asuming-Brempong 
2003).  The ERP was provided IMF and World Bank assistance, in order to reduce 
Ghana’s debts and improve trade.  However, the World Bank’s assistance depended upon 
developing the private sector (U.S. Library of Congress 2011). 
 The ERP’s focus was on the export sector, not food production (U.S. Library of 
Congress 2011).  The ERP and SAP liberalized importation.  It also improved foreign 
exchange rates, improved infrastructure, privatized state-owned enterprises, and 
liberalized trade.  The policy’s stated goals were: “restoring economic productivity at 
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minimum cost to the government”, lowering inflation (through trade, fiscal and monetary 
policies), improving foreign exchange rates, liberalizing trade, restructuring the economy 
(through privatization of state-owned enterprises), enhancing infrastructure to boost 
commerce, and increasing availability of necessary goods (Library of Congress 2011).  
The ERP/SAP aimed to deregulate “both the input and output markets” (Asuming-
Brempong 2003).   
The policy was implemented in three phases.  During the first, governmental 
expenditures was reduced in order to encourage private production.  This cut the deficit 
from 6.3 percent of GDP in 1982 to 0.1 percent in 1986, even though large infrastructure 
improvements took place in 1986.  The government sold assets, increased privatization, 
and implemented exchange reforms to devaluate the cedi during the second phase (1987-
9).  Foreign exchange bureaus were introduced in 1988, cutting the “hard-currency black 
market”.  The final phase involved more monetary reforms and reduced corporate taxes 
(Library of Congress 2011).  However, monetary policies flipped back and forth between 
being restrictive and liberal between 1985 and 1995 (Asuming-Brempong 2003). 
The 1987-90 Agricultural Services Rehabilitation Project (ASRP) had similar 
objectives.  The policy aimed to strengthen and improve the services of the Ministry of 
Food and Agriculture and reform existing practices to privatize production and marketing 
of various agricultural inputs (such as veterinary drugs and fertilizer) (Asuming-
Brempong 2003).    
The annual agricultural growth rate decreased from 3.57 percent during the 1980s 
to 1.97 percent during the 1990s (Asuming-Brempong 2003).  Also due to the ERP (and 
its subsequent import liberalization and lack of available credit), many governmental 
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workers became unemployed (aka “retrenched”); 18,000 workers were “retrenched” from 
the state enterprises and civil service and another 40,000 by the Ghana Cocoa Board.  
Budget devoted to agriculture plummeted from ten percent in 1983 to 3.5 percent in 
1988.  PAMSCAD was created to mitigate for the negative social consequences of the 
ERP (and related economic reforms), and its focus was aid to the poorest citizens, who 
were primarily small-scale miners and artisans (U.S. Library of Congress 2011).   
 
Improving upon the ERP/SAP 
Though the economic policy reforms greatly contributed to environmental 
degradation, PAMSCAD did not address this.  The ERP greatly increased incentives to 
produce export crops like cocoa, but the costs of improved agricultural technologies 
drastically increased.  Therefore, these were not commonly used, leading to reduced 
overall agricultural productivity.  Hence, more land became cultivated and degraded, 
worsening deforestation (Asuming-Brempong 2003).   
            The Programme of Actions to Mitigate the Social Cost of Adjustment, or 
PAMSCAD (1988), facilitated “donor-funded community initiated development 
projects”, supported education, increased employment, and provided assistance to 
retrenched civil servants and other workers.   PAMSCAD was successful in improving 
the livelihoods of those who were harmed by the ERP/SAP.  The Programme was 
strongly supported by donors.   Water and sanitation also greatly improved, and this 
positively impacted agricultural productivity.  However, poverty worsened during the 
mid-late 1980s, and many individuals moved from urban to rural areas (Asuming-
Brempong 2003).   
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 The Financial Sector Adjustment Programme (FINSAP) was created in 1988 with 
financial assistance from the IMF and the World Bank.  This was created to address 
“structural and institutional weaknesses of the financial sector” in order to increase the 
Structural Adjustment Program’s effectiveness.  Deficits were cut, and the money supply 
was controlled more stringently.  The Cedi’s exchange rate was converted from a flexible 
to a fixed rate.  Rural banks were restructured by the Bank of Ghana, through the 1989-92 
Rural Finance Project (which was also World Bank funded).  This was to mitigate the 
agricultural productivity decline of the 1970s-80s, by enhancing local capacity to create 
and implement rural finance policy (Asuming-Brempong 2003).  
            Prior to these reforms, credit was granted to “priority sectors” (such as the 
agricultural sector).  Because of this, loans to agricultural endeavors were required to 
comprise at least 20 percent of those allocated by banks.   The Central Bank fixed interest 
rates on loans to agriculture at least two to three percent below rates to other sectors.  
However, these credit ceilings were removed by FINSAP.  Many claim that FINSAP has 
increased credit mobilization and efficiency in credit allocation.  However, credit to 
“priority areas” has been decreasing.   Only 15.9 percent of total loans in 1990—
considerably lower than the mandated 20 percent—were allocated to agriculture by 
commercial and secondary banks, and this further declined to 5.7 percent in 1995 
(Asuming-Brempong 2003).    
             Agricultural real output even declined in 1990 and 1992; between 1989 and 1992, 
the agricultural growth rate was the lowest in recent years, at 2.6 percent, with shrinks of 
two percent and 0.6 percent in years 1990 and 1992.  However, the services sector grew 
unprecedentedly.  Lending rates have been high (almost 50 percent annually in the 1990s) 
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and available credit low.  Agriculture has low rates of return; financial institutions instead 
invested in treasury bills and other assets that bear high interest rates.  Agriculture is rain-
fed and therefore depends entirely upon weather conditions, so yields are uncertain 
(Asuming-Brempong 2003).   
            Subsidies for agricultural inputs were completely removed by 1991.  The 
agricultural sector also took a hit from the excess demand for foreign exchange, which 
devalued the Cedi; agricultural inputs from abroad became unaffordable.  Because the 
increases in the prices of improved agricultural technologies therefore outpaced prices of 
agriculture output, they were (and are) not implemented.  Hence, agricultural productivity 
has remained low; increased levels of production have only occurred because more land 
was exploited.  Incentive to produce agricultural outputs that are not exported was 
decreased: because other countries subsidize inputs, domestic producers are unable to 
compete, regardless of the discount benefit from the undervalued Cedi.  In addition, post-
harvest losses are high from limited storage and processing capability (Asuming-
Brempong 2003).   
          The 1991 National Feeder Roads Rehabilitation and Maintenance Project was 
created to facilitate economic development in rural areas.  By improving feeder roads, 
transportation costs decrease and ease of agricultural endeavors is improved.  The four-
year project includes a contracted feeder road rehabilitation and maintenance program, a 
“sustainable management system”, institutional support (to improve planning and 
supervision), and support in decentralizing the Department of Feeder Roads (World Bank 
1999).   
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Policies to reverse the decline in agriculture 
             The PNDC party focused on augmenting local food production during the early 
1990s.  The Medium Term Agricultural Development Program (1991-2000) was 
formulated to “attain food self-sufficiency and security by the year 2000” (U.S. Library 
of Congress 2011).  The MTADP guided the Ministry of Food and Agriculture during the 
1990s.  The World Bank funded much of this, again on the condition of privatized 
agricultural marketing and freer market pricing.  Input supplies were liberalized in order 
to increase supply reliability, as competition due to lower prices diminished what was 
available (Asuming-Brempong 2003).   
MTADP objectives were to be achieved via “market-led growth in agriculture”; 
governmental output and input intervention declined, but the state increased 
infrastructure (as through feeder road establishment and repairs), irrigation, crop disease 
research and extension services.  As with most other policies, industrial production and 
improved balance of payments were stressed (Zimmerman et al 2009).  Because of World 
Bank suggestions, the government continued to depend upon the private sector to 
implement these measures; unfortunately, this put subsistence agricultural endeavors at a 
gross disadvantage (U.S. Library of Congress 2011).  With limited state assistance, vital 
services (such as fertilizer application and pest control) are lacking. 
MTADP programs aimed to increase annual growth in agricultural GDP to four 
percent.  MTADP projects include the Agricultural Diversification Project (1991-9), 
National Agricultural Research Project (1991-9), Land Conservation and Smallholder 
Rehabilitation Project (1991-7), National Agricultural Extension Project (1992-2000), 
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Agricultural Sector Adjustment Credit (1992-9), and Agricultural Sector Investment 
Project (1994-2000) (Asuming-Brempong 2003). 
The Agricultural Diversification Project was created with the intention of 
increasing production of non-cocoa tree crops, such as oil palm, coffee, and rubber, and 
horticultural crops (i.e. pineapple) for exportation and import substitution so that Ghana 
will be less dependent upon cocoa.  The ADP provides “training and technical support” to 
farmers and institutions that produce the “target crops” (Asuming-Brempong 2003).   
The National Agricultural Research Project (NARP) attempted to develop and 
reform research management, human resources, research facilities, library/information 
systems, and sustainability of financial resources.  The government and a few other 
donors financially support Ghanaian agricultural research, but the funding is unreliable.  
NARP called for all contributions to be routed through the National Agricultural 
Research Committee, though other options, like a donation-fed research development 
fund, were “explored” (Asuming-Brempong 2003).   
            The Land Conservation and Smallholder Rehabilitation Project encouraged retired 
public and civil sector employees to farm.  To do so, credit and training was provided 
(Asuming-Brempong 2003). 
The number of agricultural extension agents was increased from one agent per 
1,504 farmers in 1991 to one per 780 in 2000 due to the National Agricultural Extension 
Project (Asuming-Brempong 2003).  Extension agents, among other things, apply 
research knowledge and instruct famers about improved agricultural technology and 
practices (Bokor 2005).  It is worth noting that the number of extension agents has 
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dwindled to one per 3,000 and that unreliable transportation decreases the agents’ 
efficiency (Ghana News Agency 2007).   
 The Agricultural Sector Adjustment Credit supported agricultural sector reforms 
and poverty alleviation.   ASAC requested creation of poverty reduction programs from 
the government in 1992-93 (Asuming-Brempong 2003).   
            The Agricultural Sector Investment Project aimed to increase the allocation of 
technical and financial resources towards rural development.  This also supported 
agricultural processing, market infrastructure, storage capacity expansion, maintenance of 
feeder roads, and provision of water in rural areas (Asuming-Brempong 2003).   
            The Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Development Strategy (AAGDS) of 
1996 followed the MTADP to promote agricultural growth.  Proposed initiatives 
included: increased marketing access for certain products, access to financial services and 
technological advancements for sustainable production, infrastructure, and human 
resource and institutional capacity (Asuming-Brempong 2003).   
            The 1996 civilian government launched the VISION 2020 Framework (Asuming-
Brempong 2003).   The Framework was introduced in 1996 with the objective of 
transforming Ghana into a middle income state by year 2020 (Government of Ghana 
1995).  Its focus was on agriculture and forestry to provide these improvements, with 
education cited as the biggest impediment to achieving the VISION 2020 goals (Oteng 
1999).  VISION 2020 “is not a plan but a planning framework to provide guidance to 
planning agencies to prepare their own development plans”.  This defers the power to the 
agencies.  The actual plans were to be created and implemented by “Ministries, Sectoral 
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Agencies, and District Assemblies”; these are the “Planning Authorities” (Government of 
Ghana 1995).   
 VISION 2020 set the goal of an annual growth rate of agricultural output at four 
percent (1996) by year 2000, compared to an actual rate of 1.8 percent prior.  As with 
other failed policies, VISION 2020 was overly ambitious.  Therefore, it only lasted for 
five years (instead of 24).  In spite of this, the plan’s first five-year rolling plan (5YRP) 
included concrete and useful steps, such as increasing all farm inputs, improving 
infrastructure, encouraging private enterprise (with a plan to privatize all state-owned 
agricultural enterprises by 2000), and diversifying crop production (Government of 
Ghana 1995).  It included initiatives to decrease deforestation and drought as well 
(Iddrisu and Telly 1999).  The 5YRP is intended to be a “reference document that 
informs the entire country as well as the international community of the enabling 
environment to be provided by Ghana government (sic) in support of private investment”.   
It is also used to inform NGOs of broad social and economic intentions (Government of 
Ghana 1995).  Because Ghana is very “aid-dependent” (Jeffrey 2009), it is necessary to 
inform the international community in order to fund these initiatives.       
               In 2001, VISION 2020 was declared “dormant” and “dead” by the government 
in official statements made by the Minister of Economic Planning and Regional 
Cooperation and the Minister of Finance (Ghana News Agency 2001), (Accra Mail 
2001).  During its short life, the program did not receive adequate funding (Ghana News 
Agency 2001).  This has been attributed to political reasons; the year 2000 marked a 
majority party switch from the NDC to the NPP (Accra Mail 2001). 
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               The 1997 Village Infrastructure Project was created to improve rural living 
standards.  One initiative is improved rural water infrastructure and management, with an 
emphasis on water conservation techniques and investments in technologies that would 
provide water for human consumption and agricultural use.  The Project also aims to 
improve feeder roads.  Improvement of post-harvest infrastructure was also a priority, 
with aims of providing community crop drying (to cut post-harvest losses), storage, and 
processing facilities.  The Project also intended to increase the roles of District 
Assemblies, NGOs, and other community organizations (World Bank 2000).  
            The Smallholder Credit, Input Supply, and Marketing Project (SCIMP) was 
implemented during 1990-9 in the Ashanti, Brong-Ahafo, and Volta Regions.  This 
provided farmers and food traders with short-term loans.  SCIMP also helped to create 
dams and hand-dug wells (for agricultural and personal household use) and farm access 
roads through financial support to the Department of Feeder Roads (Asuming-Brempong 
2003). 
           Ghana has been struggling intermittently with national deficits (though they 
totaled over 200 million USD in the early 1990s) in recent years.  Agriculture helps with 
Ghana’s balance of payments through commodity exports and by providing import 
substitutions.  Agriculture accounted for 43.9 percent of export earnings in 1999, but this 
figure rapidly declined to 33.9 percent in 2001.  The sector is incapable of producing 
adequate amounts of those commodities that the country has a competitive advantage in 
providing (Asuming-Brempong 2003).   
            The Presidential Special Initiative on Cassava-Starch (PSI) was implemented in 
2001 as an attempt to diversify the economy.  The PSI aims to increase jobs and foreign 
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exchange earnings.  In addition to its use as Ghana’s main starch, cassava has many 
industrial applications.  Approximately 75 percent of farmers already grow cassava, an 
indigenous staple crop, to some extent.  Therefore, knowledge of how to grow it is 
already widespread.  In addition, it grows well in “suboptimal conditions”, which would 
enable it to be grown in “marginal land” and the challenging climatic conditions of the 
north. Hence, there is great potential to expand cassava production.  The PSI also aimed 
to establish cassava processing plants (to be funded by private investors) that would serve 
as models to other starch processing operations (Andoh 2009: 88-93).   
            The Agricultural Services Sub-sector Investment Project (AgSSIP) of 2002 
combined the aims of the Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Development Strategy, 
Food and Agricultural Sector Development Policy, and Ghana Poverty Reduction 
Strategy (Asuming-Brempong 2003).  The World Bank provided funding, as AgSSIP’s 
objectives were formulated to bolster the agricultural sector and reduce rural poverty 
(Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2006).  AgSSIP focused on Farmer Based 
Organizations, as this was believed to be a more effective means of disseminating 
extension services and increasing access to inputs, markets, and credit (Ministry of Food 
and Agriculture 2006).    
The peak agricultural growth rate of the 1990s, 5.2 percent, was achieved in 1996.  
Though this quickly diminished to 2.1 percent in 2000, it slowly improved in years 2001 
and 2002 (Asuming-Brempong 2003).  
            Production of “non-traditional” (non-cocoa) export crops has been pushed.  This 
has been successful; these crops are consistently contributing to foreign exchange 
earnings, and Ghana’s Northern Region has faced population growth since rice 
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production intensified.  However, the soil in the Northern Region is poor and it contains 
less water there than the rest of Ghana.  Unfortunately, Northern Region is also 
agriculturally based.  Hence, population growth in the Northern Region is a negative 
indicator.  But while the current population (2003) grows at 2.9 percent annually, which 
is higher than the 2.5 percent national average, this has declined from a 1984 annual 
population growth rate of 3.4 percent.  Starting in 2001, the government attempted self-
sufficiency in foods like cereals and “starchy staples” (such as corn, roots, and tubers).  
Ghana’s north has a comparative advantage in growing these (Asuming-Brempong 
2003).   
 
Biofuels further threaten land security 
Efforts to increase production of biomass energy, which was promoted through 
the 1996 VISION 2020, have been accelerating recently (Government of Ghana 1995).  
However, biofuel production may pose a risk to Ghanaian agriculture/food security.  
“Fragile land ownership rights”, which are mostly collective rather than individual, are 
threatened.  Vulnerabilities in land laws do not prevent multinationals from acquiring 
smallholder farmers’ properties with “little or no compensation”.  Most biofuel 
companies are foreign-owned, some with Ghanaian partners.  Land acquisition for food 
crop and non-food crop production to suit the needs of biofuel producers has been 
“aggressive”, and these fuels will primarily be exported to developed countries (Dogbevi 
2001).   
Ghana’s northern areas are most vulnerable to land encroachment.  Most biofuel 
companies are becoming established in the north.  There, “land is abundant and cheap”.  
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Ghana’s poverty is concentrated there as well; though the north only accounts for 17.2 
percent of Ghana’s population, it contains 54 percent of its poor.  The potential 
consequences of land encroachment in the northern regions are far-reaching; much of the 
grains that feed Ghana (which are scarce) are grown in the north (Dogbevi 2001).   
Biofuels supporters claim that the plants (especially Jatropha) can grow on 
marginal/degraded lands, the use of which would not displace any communities.  
However, “what are often presented as ownerless, unused lands are at times the source of 
subsistence for the poorest people, and provide them with food, medicine, construction 
materials, fuel and other resources, aside from being used normally for pasture”.  Because 
the land is not very valuable, marginal lands are not clearly defined, which weakens 
smallholders’ property rights.  Regardless, biofuels companies do not intend to use 
marginal lands, since the yields are much lower than from fertile lands.  There is no 
policy restraining the biofuels industry in particular, which spurs “uncontrolled and 
unregulated development of the biofuels sector” (Dogbevi 2001). 
 
The creation of FASDEP I and its successors, FASDEP II and METASIP 
            The first Food and Agricultural Sector Development Policy (FASDEP I) of 2002 
was created with the main objective of modernizing the agricultural sector.  It is a holistic 
policy based upon the 1996 Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Development Strategy, 
one of the policies that spun off from MTADP with the intention of strengthening the 
private sector to bolster the economy.  Another policy that attempted local level 
involvement, Local Government Law (Act 462) required implementation of policies at 
the district level, but it was ignored, due to lack of district capacity and inadequate 
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funding.  Many of its tenets are based upon the first Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy.  
A poverty and social impact analysis declared that the policies would not alleviate 
poverty as desired due to the inability to modernize poor smallholder agricultural 
endeavors.  This reflects the lack of necessary infrastructure, adequate marketing, and 
availability of credit and technology.  In addition, the policy “did not sufficiently reflect 
client perspectives”.   
            The overall goal of FASDEP II—which is intended to be an improved version of 
FASDEP I—is “to enhance Ghana’s comparative advantage and translate it into 
competitive advantage in producing the needed volumes of commodity and quality on a 
timely basis”.  FASDEP II (2007) also prioritizes sustainability, scientific advancements, 
use of more advanced technologies, and commercialization, based on market-driven 
growth.  However, fewer commodities are targeted.  Most notably, food security is the 
main objective rather than self-sufficiency.  This is a crucial development; the previous 
governments had erroneously been fixated on self-sufficiency in order to achieve food 
security (Asuming-Brempong 2003).   
The Medium Term Agriculture Sector Investment Plan (METASIP) is mostly 
based upon FASDEP II.  The six shared objectives are: food security, income growth, 
increased market competitiveness, sustainable land management (and other aspects of 
agricultural production), increased use of improved technology, and more coordination 
(Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: xi).    
             Local markets are paying relatively higher prices for crops such as oil palm and 
corn, which has encouraged farmers to expand non-cocoa agricultural production in 
recent years.  In addition, increasing cocoa prices have caused cocoa output to skyrocket 
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from 159,000 metric tonnes in 1983 to 493,000 in 2000.  Fixed prices for all agricultural 
outputs except for cocoa were removed.  Subsidization of fertilizer, agro-chemicals, and 
other inputs was discontinued as well, which drastically reduced use of fertilizer 
(Asuming-Brempong 2003). 
            METASIP has the incredibly optimistic aim of increasing by 50 percent 
“marketed output of staple crops by smallholders” by 2015 (Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture 2010: 44).  To improve market access, the Policy aims to identify successful 
leading agricultural firms and industries, educate farmers on demand-driven production, 
and lobby businesses to “participate in selected commodity value chains”.  As optimistic 
is the intention to increase exportation of “non-traditional agricultural commodities” from 
small-scale farmers by 2015 (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 45). 
 
Improved economic considerations 
           The agricultural sector is also considered capable of absorbing a large number of 
unemployed workers, due to its labor intensity.  MoFA believes staple crops—more so 
than export crops—to be capable of rapid growth and reducing poverty.  The Agency 
further states: “contribution of agriculture to national social viability has been low 
because the structural transformation of the sector has been slow”.   
             The Policy will not use quotas and tariffs to limit importation.  MoFA believes 
the economy to have recovered from the economic crisis of the 1980s due to “the sector’s 
capacity to increase exports, government tax revenue, domestic food supply and to raise 
per capita incomes”.   However, this rapid recovery is not uniquely inherent to 
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agriculture.   But unlike prior strategies, FASDEP II is tailored to differing regional needs 
and comparative advantages.   
             Unlike FASDEP I, FASDEP II recognizes the existence of different categories of 
farmers (even within the subgroup “smallholders”) and has created policy accordingly.  
The Policy focuses on risk-prone subsistence farmers, reducing their vulnerability and 
bolstering productivity.  FASDEP II also aims to link commercial and smallholder 
endeavors “for their mutual benefit”.  Although linking commercial and subsistence 
farmers is controversial, FASDEP II is the first Ghanaian policy that takes the needs of 
small-scale farming operations into account. 
Many of FASDEP II’s strategies are based upon the second Ghana Poverty 
Reduction Strategy (GPRS II), whose main goal is to elevate Ghana’s economy from a 
lower- to a medium-income country, optimally by 2015.  Education, agriculture, 
increased access to health services and safe water, improved urban housing options, and 
macroeconomic policy are key tenets of GPRS II (National Development Planning 
Commission 2005).  
To increase use and cost-effectiveness of inputs, FASDEP II endeavors to 
increase “competitiveness and cost-reduction in input markets”.  The strategies to 
accomplish this are increasing trade of agricultural inputs (by creating policies to 
encourage this), encouraging district input vendors, educating the public on the benefits 
of input application, and promoting local production.  Those initiatives that decrease cost 
will likely be the most effective, since price is the most significant barrier (rather than 
awareness).   
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Policy funding 
         FASDEP II aims to provide steady funding of agricultural initiatives.  However, 
maintaining the financial resources necessary to support prior policies has been a major 
challenge throughout Ghana’s policy history.  For example, many programs of the 1990s 
were created through and funded by the World Bank.  This funding was discontinued, 
and subsequently, so were the policies.  The same was true of the National Agricultural 
Extension Project and the National Agricultural Research Project, until the Agricultural 
Services Sub-sector Investment Project renewed their funding.  Ties with Development 
Partners are also being strengthened, which is improving budgetary support.    
FASDEP II intends to elicit funding from the Government, development partners, 
private sector, civil society, and international financial institutions.  The Multi Donor 
Budget Support, which was already adopted in 2003, acts in accordance with the Growth 
and Poverty Reduction Strategy in providing additional funding to the Ghanaian 
government (Ghana Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 2008).  Funding 
strategies are also aligned with the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (Ministry of 
Food and Agriculture 2007: 53).  The Policy listed the following as potential causes of 
failure: inadequate funding by the Government, slow allocation of funding by the 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, lack of attention paid to the agricultural 
sector by the District Assemblies (although one of its departments is the District 
Directorate of Agriculture), lack of participation by other agencies, limited private sector 
participation, and inadequate producer response (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2007: 
54).  
82 
 
The budget that METASIP requires for its implementation greatly exceeds 
estimated available financial resources; the funding gap is approximately two-thirds of 
the estimated cost (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: xiv).  Additional expenditures 
on top of this for infrastructure improvements are also recommended (Ministry of Food 
and Agriculture 2010: xiii).  However, the Policy expects the private sector to step up to 
close the gap between desired and currently feasible levels of funding.  Additional funds 
to be allocated toward METASIP are expected to increase by six percent annually 
(Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: xiii).   
METASIP aims to invest heavily in private-public partnerships to reduce the 
amount of public capital necessary and to push market-driven initiatives (Ministry of 
Food and Agriculture 2010: xiii).  In doing this, governmental funding is expected to be 
“recovered” as well.  This is considered necessary because MoFA spending is projected 
to increase by about 30 percent (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: xiv).  There 
currently exists no formal means of engaging the private sector and civil society with 
agencies within the agricultural sector, but achievement of such by 2011 is outlined in 
METASIP (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 55).  
Because the gap between the projected funds and costs is so great, certain 
programs are given much greater precedence, as supporting all is clearly not feasible.  
The two given the highest priority are Programme 1: Food Security and Emergency 
Preparedness and 2: Increased Growth in Incomes.  However, the sum of the estimated 
costs of these two programs exceeds that of projected available funding by about two-
sevenths (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: xiv, xv).  In addition, the three 
programs that are not given priority—sustainable management of land and the 
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environment, science and technology for food and agricultural development, and 
institutional coordination—would improve food security and long-term economic 
growth.  
As called for by FASDEP II, at least ten percent of the government’s budget is to 
be dedicated to the expansion of the agricultural sector, in accordance with the Maputo 
Declaration.  However, the government spent just nine percent of its budget on 
agriculture in 2009 (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: xiii).   
 
Research 
 FASDEP II focuses on improving value addition, research endeavors, 
productivity, and market access.  However, current research endeavors are ineffective.  
The Ministry of Food and Agriculture recognized that there is “low uptake of research 
findings by stakeholders” and “duplication of research efforts”.  Further coordination 
with NGOs, domestic and foreign research institutions is necessary to optimize 
efficiency.  Research is necessary to optimize “development of value chains of 
commodities targeted for food security, income growth and diversification, external 
markets, and linkage with industry” and improve policy.  Improving the relevance of 
agricultural technologies and promoting “demand-driven” research are top priorities of 
FASDEP II.  To achieve this, further participation of farmers is encouraged.   
 The Ministry of Food and Agriculture envisions playing a role in creating unity 
among projects and sub-sectors (i.e. among food, horticultural, and industrial crops).  But 
in 2007, there was little collaboration within the Ministry of Food and Agriculture and 
84 
 
among governmental organizations, although FASDEP I created a framework to facilitate 
this.  In addition, “exit strategies” from donor-funded projects have not been formulated.   
 
Ambitious projected growth rates 
FASDEP II goals include attainment of a six to eight percent annual agricultural 
growth rate over the next four years, increasing forestry and logging by five percent 
annually, and maintaining cocoa’s strength and support of other sectors.   These appear to 
be repeated mistakes.  With diminishing land productivity and availability, it is 
impossible to attain these goals without drastically increasing productivity per unit of 
land, unless the few remaining preserved forests are encroached upon.  However, 
infrastructure improvement is once again pushed.  This is a step in the right direction, as 
it will improve input access and produce marketability.   
 
Sustainability 
FASDEP II is also making sure that sub-sector policies are consistent with 
FASDEP II objectives, as these provide the framework for implementing the Policy 
(Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2007: 24).  One such focus is sustainable land 
management (SLM) practices.  All agricultural policies and plans are required under 
FASDEP II to be evaluated by Strategic Environmental Assessments and every project by 
an Environmental Impact Assessment.    
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Attempts to increase crop yield 
             To achieve food security, FASDEP II aims to develop no more than five staple 
crops nationally, and MoFA will only support one or two crops in each district.   This is 
so that only those crops which have the best comparative advantage and are most 
desirable in markets will be produced.  However, diversification would actually increase 
security, as the crops would be collectively much less susceptible to pests and disease. 
             FASDEP II aimed to introduce high-yielding crops with short growth periods, 
improve post-harvest storage and processing, and collaborate with the Ministry of 
Transportation (for road cargo) and the Ministry of Harbours and Railways to enhance 
crop distribution.   Because Ghanaian agencies are jealous and competitive with each 
other, this collaboration would be an enormous step forward if successful. 
           Diversification into tree crops, vegetables, and poultry—based on comparative 
advantage—is also a FASDEP II strategy.   Improving agricultural practices is another 
priority, as this has great marketability and efficiency ramifications.  Improvements in 
infrastructure and delivery of services are prioritized.  FASDEP II also favors increased 
production of certain cash crops, such as mango, oil palm, rubber, plantain, and citrus 
fruits.  METASIP intends to add cotton, soybean, and sheanuts to the targeted crops in 
the northern regions, which have much higher levels of poverty (Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture 2010: 36).   
 METASIP aims to increase male and female income earned from cash crop 
production by 20 percent and 30 percent, respectively, by 2015.  To achieve this, the 
following initiatives are to be employed: increasing seed growers’ capacity, educating 
agricultural producers about improved technologies, increasing cash crop farmers’ 
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capacities (in order to improve efficiency and product quality), and to facilitate cash crop 
producers’ access to credit (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 37).  
 
Urban Agriculture 
           Urban agriculture is promoted under both FASDEP II and METASIP as a 
“sustainable alternative means of livelihood for poor migrants” (Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture 2010: 42).  It accounts for over 50 percent of food consumed in Accra 
(Maddox-Fisher 2010).  Urban farming “insulates the urban poor from price shocks”; 
price inflation, particularly on foods, is rampant in Ghana.  However, urban farmers are 
often in a very precarious situation, as farms are often seized or sold to developers.  In 
addition, crops and livestock are vulnerable to toxic chemicals, as dirty waters are often 
used (Brunhuber 2008); untreated waste water is the main source of irrigation for urban 
agriculture (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 42).  Urban agriculture occurs 
“anywhere there’s a patch of green” in the cities, such as near busy roads and in dumps 
(Brunhuber 2008).  Plot sizes are roughly 0.001 to 0.2 hectares in urban areas, and these 
are diminishing with “dredging of main drains” and land development.  Decreasing soil 
fertility due to insufficient (or nonexistent) fallow periods is also problematic, as in more 
traditional agricultural practices.  Most urban agricultural activities are legally permitted.  
But within Accra, agriculture must be registered with the metropolitan officer of health if 
cultivation is occurring outside of one’s land (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 
42).  METASIP intends to conduct brucellosis and tuberculosis screening of milk 
collected in urban areas and to “organize mass vaccination, endo and ectoparasitic 
interventions against the endemic diseases in the peri-urban areas” (Ministry of Food and 
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Agriculture 2010: 43).  However, if these safeguards fail to be implemented, the health 
hazards of urban agriculture could outweigh the benefits.  
  
Gender 
Many urban farmers are women who have left their homes due to domestic 
violence (Brunhuber 2008).  Domestic abuse is prevalent in Ghana and viewed as an 
“inevitable” stage in relationships, but in only two percent of cases in which women 
sought legal interventions were women advised to press charges.  In addition, only three 
percent of cases in which women press charges lead to arrest (Sarpong 2002).  Wife 
beating is viewed as “an acceptable norm of society”, and it is viewed as a “form of 
discipline” rather than abuse.  Women also have limited means of supporting themselves 
(and their children) independently, as they often are not permitted to hold property (Ofei-
Aboagye 1994).    
Gender equality is another new goal of FASDEP II.  For adequate human resource 
development, FASDEP II aims to increase private sector participation, cost effectiveness, 
and gender equity.  To increase female participation, the Policy requires affirmative 
action in MoFA training and recruitment.  An audit of the Ministry’s human resources is 
also outlined.  FASDEP II also calls for improved institutional structures, collection and 
use of gender disaggregated data, and conducting gender analysis of agricultural 
programs so that workloads do not become skewed.  During the METASIP consultative 
process, gender representation was taken into account (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 
2007: 2). 
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Poor product quality 
            A large volume of exports is returned by foreign purchasers due to inadequate 
quality.  The main cause of this is limited knowledge in external market requirements.   
Logistics in marketing is also a great area for improvement.   In addition, a weak legal 
infrastructure discourages contractual agreements in production, processing, and 
marketing.  Agricultural processors typically receive “low, poor quality and irregular 
supplies of raw materials”.   
            FASDEP II also aims to improve agricultural practices and create stricter quality 
control standards so that exports will not be rejected by importers due to sanitary reasons.   
Creating “clusters” of small- to medium-scale farmers and producers is another goal, as 
this would improve access to technical advice and services.   The Policy also hopes to 
improve and enhance local agricultural processing via improved technology and training.    
            Capacity-building of extension services—whose primary function is to educate 
farmers on improved farming methods (this could therefore help to improve quality and 
efficiency of exports)—provided by MoFA is another priority.   In 2006, approximately 
one out of ten land-using farmers over 21 years of age who were surveyed had not heard 
of the extension service (Boateng 2006: 19-29).  Only 2.5 percent knew that one of the 
services provided by the agency was the supply of inputs, and 30.8 percent reported 
discontinuation of extension service staff visits.  Only 41.5 percent were satisfied, with 
just 37.9 percent viewing the extension service as reliable.  While 38.1 percent reported 
gaining new knowledge or technology, only 22.2 percent received advice that led to 
higher yields.  Of the 58.5 percent who were unsatisfied, 47 percent believed the services 
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to be too expensive, 46.9 percent unreliable, and 6.1 percent received no follow-up 
(Boateng 2006: 19-29). 
              
Irrigation 
MoFA recognizes that water is used inefficiently by formal irrigation facilities, 
and that “most irrigation schemes are designed and operated with little consideration for 
land and water degradation and energy efficiency”.  FASDEP II aims to increase 
productivity from 30 percent to 80 percent.  Use of small-scale pumps for subsistence 
farmers along perennial bodies of water, alternative methods of water delivery, and 
access of adequate water to urban farmers are also promoted.  A disproportionately large 
amount of northern Ghana inhabitants is engaged in agricultural activities, although that 
region is semiarid and farming completely depends upon rainfall.   
Enhancing irrigation capacity would be a means of reducing uncertainties in 
agricultural production due to climatic variability; as of 2008, only 0.5 percent of 
agricultural products were irrigated.  Increasing the proportion of irrigated lands is also 
desirable according to policymakers because it enables the same piece of land to be used 
more frequently (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 26).  However, soil depletion, 
which is currently the greatest limiting factor in agriculture, would greatly increase. 
Although the targeted irrigation intensification by METASIP is a 50 percent increase by 
2015, the targeted increase in productivity is only 25 percent (Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture 2010: 33).  These priorities are misplaced; merely increasing the efficiency 
increases capacity in turn, but the opposite is not the case.   
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One of the greatest barriers to establishing irrigation infrastructure is the cost; 
initiation is “capital intensive” and creation requires long-term investment to yield 
returns.  The Policy proposes that irrigation infrastructure be developed as a public good, 
likely leased to private associations and management bodies “to ensure efficiency”.  It 
was noted: “irrigated agriculture can only be viable if there are backward linkages to 
infrastructure, inputs, and research and forward linkages to agro-processing and 
marketing” (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 27).   
 
Plant disease and pests 
 One of FASDEP’s goals is to reduce crop pest losses from 30-50 percent to 10-15 
percent.  Coupled with storage losses of roughly 50 percent, most of Ghana’s crops are 
wasted.  Large causes are exotic pests, minimal adoption of certified planting materials 
and means of plant protection by farmers (especially those who cultivate food crops), and 
weak enforcement of regulations.  In addition, pesticides are commonly misapplied, and 
importation standards of recipient countries often change.  Previous policies with the 
same objectives are the Guidelines for the National Plant Protection Policy, Prevention 
and Control of Pests and Diseases of Plants Act (Act 307, 1965), NRCD 100 of 1972, 
Seed Inspection and Certification Decree, and the Pesticides Controls and Management 
Act (Act 528, 1996).   
 FASDEP II aims to deal with the plant pest and disease problem by enforcing an 
international standard and improving “plant quarantine systems” at points of entry, as by 
increasing collaboration among the Plant Protection and Regulatory Services Directorate, 
Customs Excise and Preventive Service, and Ghana Immigration Service.   
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Efficiency improvements 
The targeted agricultural sector annual growth rate continues to be six percent, as 
was the goal of Operation Feed Yourself.  Closing the gap between potential and 
observed yields by increasing productivity on the land (rather than encroaching into other 
land areas) would help Ghana to meet this targeted annual growth rate.  The difference 
between potential and actual yields is approximately 50 percent for most crops (Ministry 
of Food and Agriculture 2010: 70).   
The difference between actual yields and estimated optimal yields is up to 55 
percent for certain crops.  This is mostly due to the limited use of inputs; only five to ten 
percent of subsistence farmers with one or fewer hectares of land used fertilizer, whereas 
30 percent of farmers with over five hectares used fertilizer (which is still quite low).  
Inputs are limited primarily from high cost, limited availability and lack of confidence in 
input effectiveness (due to adulterated products) (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 
23).   
Post-harvest losses are astronomical; 35 percent of corn and 34 percent of cassava 
is lost (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 24).  METASIP aims to reduce these 
between 20 and 50 percent by 2015 (the targeted percentage decrease in waste being 
dependent on the crop) (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 31).  One way is by 
promoting processing, which would improve the products’ shelf lives. 
Reducing post-harvest losses is another focus of the Policy.  METASIP intends to 
decrease losses of mango, plantain, tomato, pineapple, papaya, and citrus between 25 and 
50 percent by 2015.  The means outlined to achieve this objective are training (of 
extension staff, producers, processors, and marketers), improving storage facilities and 
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transportation, promoting commodity “cold chain handling” (which will likely be 
particularly difficult, since this infrastructure is basically inexistent at the moment), and 
using “appropriate handling containers” (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 38).  
Some proposed initiatives to improve transportation of agricultural goods are: linking 
district capitals with paved roads, connecting at least 70 percent of communities by roads 
to district capitals, and constructing farm trucks in agricultural areas (which is a bad idea, 
since the infrastructure does not exist; this would likely be fantastically inefficient) 
(Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 41).   
 
Land management 
Land degradation threatens approximately 63 percent of Ghana’s land area.  
Leading causes of this are traditional bush burning (with insufficient fallow periods), 
improper use of irrigation, and improper distribution of agro-chemicals (Ministry of Food 
and Agriculture 2010: 46).  Severe erosion also occurs, as agriculture is conducted on 
extremely steep gradients.  Land is limited, and livestock is an inefficient use of land, but 
FASDEP II aims for a 50 percent increase in output of animal products by 2015.   
In 2009, the Ghanaian government introduced a 37 million Cedi fertilizer subsidy 
to increase the affordability of fertilizer, particularly for small-scale food crop farmers 
(Ghana News Agency).  The subsidy is in effect such that fertilizer costs from December 
2008 would appear to be unchanged for the farmer, even though the unsubsidized 
fertilizer price was exactly double by the following April.  With the unsubsidized price, 
the Minister of Food and Agriculture estimated fertilizer use by small scale farmers to 
collectively decline by approximately 70 percent, cutting cereal production by 20 percent.  
93 
 
This corresponds to a production shortfall that would cost 62.5 million USD to import.  
Therefore, with these estimations, the subsidy is less costly.  Measures to prevent abuse 
of this policy are coupon allocation, border control, and random inspections (Ghana New 
Agency 2009).  Since the use of fertilizer has been limited, perhaps further discounted 
prices would create even greater economic benefits. 
In order to predict climatic and weather changes that would place certain areas at 
higher risks, MoFA intends to collaborate with the Ghana Meteorological Agency.  The 
Ministry also intends to encourage farmers to prepare, in addition to providing assistance 
for adaptation to and mitigation against the weathers’ impacts (Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture 2010: 46).  These include soil improvement efforts, introduction of drought- 
and flood-tolerant crop species, and growing high-yielding and short-duration varieties.  
However, short-duration crop species would be undesirable if they were used for the 
purpose of more frequent harvest, as this would rapidly deplete the soil.  And yet again, 
cost, limited access to inputs, and lack of credit impede the introduction of necessary 
improvements (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 47).   
 Another pressure exerted on the lands is encroachment by other sectors.  “Prime 
agricultural land” is used for other industrial applications and housing projects (Ministry 
of Food and Agriculture 2010: 81).  METASIP aims to increase institutional capacity to 
push sustainable land management (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 47).  The 
Ministry of Food and Agriculture states: “an effective policy would enhance the positive 
influences through carbon sequestration, contribution of tree cover for conservation and 
improved quality of soil, protection of watersheds, and enhancement of the beauty of 
natural landscapes” (2010: 79).  MoFA also intends to promote creation and 
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implementation of 50 community land improvement plans each year (Ministry of Food 
and Agriculture 2010: 48).  Like FASDEP II, METASIP was created with the intention of 
being evaluated by a Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA), which “focus(es) on 
the four main areas of sustainability, i.e. natural resources, socio-cultural issues, 
economic issues and institutional issues” (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 79).  
The Ministry recognizes Sustainable Land Management as a means of improving the 
livelihoods of the economically disadvantaged, as it is “key to sustainable agriculture and 
has the potential to minimize waste in the sector” (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 
2010: 80).  METASIP also intends to foster enforcement and revision of the Plant and 
Fertilizer Act (803) of 2010, which was created to regulate plant, seed and fertilizer 
production (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 28).   
 
Processing 
Although incorrect assumptions of profitability are linked with “value addition” 
from processing (processing may make the net profit earned lower than without), 
METASIP aims to increase processing because of its ability to increase shelf life.  
Warehouse storage could also stabilize prices.  Hence, METASIP aims to upgrade and re-
establish adequate storage facilities.  However, processing could worsen the nutritional 
deficiencies.  But fortunately, agro-processing would be conducted “in an 
environmentally safe and sustainable manner” (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 
25).  Increasing storage and processing capacity in the private sector are other methods 
within METASIP to decrease post-harvest losses (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 
2010: 31).   
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 The Policy negatively views selling raw agricultural products, as they are “bulky, 
with short shelf lives and inconvenient to use”.  To solve this perceived problem, the 
Policy aims to produce “at least two new commercially viable products…from each of 
staple crops, horticultural crops, livestock and fisheries by 2015” (Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture 2010: 39).  METASIP intends to increase “rural industrial processing” of 
cassava, oil palm, shea nuts, cashew news, soybeans, and groundnuts by up to 40 percent 
by 2015 (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 41).  However, this is notoriously 
inefficient.  
 
Mechanization and other improved technologies 
There is limited use of agricultural machinery, which is costly and constrained 
with limited availability.  MoFA aims to mechanize agricultural activities through 
collaboration with the private sector, promotion of local tractor assembly, and 
development of human capacity (in both the public and private sectors) to manage, 
operate, and repair the machinery.  FASDEP II also promotes use of animal traction by 
establishing support centers.   
Older farmers have little technical knowledge. Youth have been targeted, as they 
are trained in agriculture and not attracted to it.  There is a great lack of specialists as 
well.  FASDEP II aims to increase financial accessibility and increased use of more 
advanced technologies to attract the youth to agriculture. 
In 2005, approximately 40 percent of farmers surveyed used some degree of 
mechanized agriculture.  The most commonly mechanized activity is land preparation.  A 
large area for improvement is processing; access to the equipment is limited, and the 
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machinery is inefficient.  Locally-manufactured equipment is “not up to food grade 
standard”.  In rice regions, which are vulnerable to floods, mechanization would vastly 
increase efficiency in agricultural production.  This is because the fields cannot be 
worked after the floods, and machinery would enable the lands to be planted before the 
rains, so that optimal harvesting could occur (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 
27).  METASIP aims to increase agricultural “mechanization”, by establishing “at least 
one private sector led mechanisation centre” per district by 2015 (Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture 2010: 27, 35).  Initiatives to support this include NGO collaboration to 
increase animal traction use, increased FBO ownership of large machinery, improving 
access to credit (which appears to be the prevailing theme of agricultural policy), and 
training technicians (which is not currently problematic).  Another important goal relating 
to mechanization is adoption of food-grade processing technology (Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture 2010: 35).  
 Improved technologies could play various other roles in increasing agricultural 
production.  Better crop varieties and use of media to improve extension services and 
information dissemination are only a couple of examples (Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture 2010: 28). 
Technology implementation and development is yet again listed as a priority to 
achieve sustainable practices.  Accordingly, initiatives to support this are: data collection 
on land degradation, integration of natural resource management and evaluation, and 
publishing research findings (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 48).  Though 
MoFA admitted that research receives very little funding (as of 2010), METASIP reflects 
an intention to create an effective monitoring and incentive system for land use 
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management by 2012 (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 49).  Although this is 
necessary, it appears to be yet another empty initiative.  Many of the specific expected 
outcomes are oddly vague, such as increasing the agricultural technologies developed by 
25 percent by 2015 (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 49, 51).  However, the 
initiative to create a functional communicative strategy within MoFA by 2012 (Ministry 
of Food and Agriculture 2010: 53) is concrete, necessary, and feasible.  
 
Standard of living implications 
The first Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS I) of 2003-5—along with its 
successors, GPRS II (2006-9) and Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda I 
(2010-3) (all were developed in concert with the World Bank)—aims to promote rural 
development through the modernization of agriculture.  The agricultural sector is 
considered integral in “raising the average real incomes of Ghanaians as a whole” 
(Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 1).   
            The strategies to be used for nutritional improvement are nutrition and health 
information and food fortification.  One of the assumptions on which FASDEP II relies is 
that “enhanced incomes will also reinforce food security through financial access to 
food”.  A later study showed that while poverty levels significantly decreased between 
1998 and 2003, malnutrition (which resulted in “stunted” children) increased (Ministry of 
Food and Agriculture 2010: 23).  Hence, increase in incomes is not enough to solve the 
problem of malnutrition.  Part of this is due to limited knowledge of macro- and micro-
nutrition.  Food production should also take these aspects into account, such as through 
food fortification (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 24).  METASIP has the 
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objective of halving the prevalence of stunting in children by 2015.  To do so, growth and 
consumption of nutritious crops (such as sweet potato, leafy vegetables, and “High 
Quality Protein Maize”) would be promoted, as would be the development of other 
nutrient-rich staples.  Other initiatives include micro-nutrient fortification, availability of 
more healthy foods through a school feeding program, and nutritional education 
(Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 30).   
Of the Ghanaians who fall below the extreme poverty line, 18.2 percent are 
chronically food insecure.  Another 10.3 percent of those who are “poor” but above the 
poverty line suffer from intermittent food insecurity (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 
2010: 22).  Subsistence farmers also have less diverse crops, which further worsens the 
rural poor’s economic security.  However, activities outside of farming (but still in the 
agricultural sector) could help increase diversity and subsequently lower the 
precariousness of many farmers’ existences (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 24).  
Hence, METASIP intends to increase production from bee keeping, mushroom and snail 
farming, and “small stocks” by 20-50 percent by 2015 (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 
2010: 39). 
METASIP aims to reduce the number of food insecure households by 20 percent 
before 2015 (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 32).  One of the proposed initiatives 
is engaging more impoverished citizens in off-farm agricultural activities.  To do so, 
micro and small enterprises, entrepreneurial training, exploitation of the correct markets, 
and partnerships with NGOs would be promoted (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 
30).  The ultimate goal of the Policy is to improve nutrition to obtain “higher productivity 
and reproduction” (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 23).   
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METASIP aimed to promote emergency preparedness by being able to provide 
food to people affected by disaster.  Poor weather, pests, and disease are the main causes 
of food insecurity.  Current capacity to respond to these is limited.  Forecasts and steps to 
become better-prepared would help to improve emergency response.  The Policy also 
suggests that the border controls and related organizations be used to monitor pest and 
disease outbreaks and to quench them.  The Ghana Meteorological Agency is expected to 
play a more active role in local forecasting and communicating its findings.  Food stocks 
are yet another proposed initiative (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 26). 
 
Availability of financial resources 
  MoFA has practically no control over the financial institutions that provide loans 
to cultivators.  However, the Ministry pushes group formation to obtain resources 
(Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2007: 46), although means of obtaining loans (via 
collateral) is structured around individuals.  Lack of funding is probably agriculture’s 
biggest constraint, at least partly due to low rates of loan recovery.  Agricultural credit is 
not disbursed in a timely manner, and medium- to long-term loans are least available, 
which greatly limits investments that could increase sustainability.  Through the FASDEP 
II, MoFA aims to improve operators’ credit management, create more efficient means of 
applying for loans, increase farmers’ education regarding loan procedures, increase loan 
monitoring, encourage financiers to accept a wider range of items as collateral, strengthen 
micro-financing and informal means of funding, promote the use of FBOs in delivering 
financial services, push the creation of an Agricultural Development Fund for medium- 
and long-term funding, and increase female access (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 
100 
 
2007: 46).  However, many of these means to solving the financing problem are outside 
of MoFA’s formal and informal control; the financial institutions that often are not paid 
back from agricultural loans ultimately have the control.   
High interest rates discourage agricultural investment; although they are slowly 
falling, rates still fall between 20 and 33.5 percent.  With a volatile annual rate of 
inflation that averages to about 15 percent, this corresponds to real interest rates falling 
roughly between five and 18.5 percent.  This is mostly due to the risk of loans to the 
agricultural sector.  However, extremely high interest rates may compound this problem, 
since those who are more conservative and less willing to take risks might not accept 
those terms.  In addition, commercial producers are much more likely to receive loans, 
due to their higher levels of productivity (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2007: 57). 
The Government provides “tax holidays” to the agricultural sector of up to ten 
years (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2007: 57).  However, these have had little effect 
on the agricultural sector, as high energy costs and poor infrastructure have restrained the 
sector much more than taxation (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2007: 57-8).  MoFA 
will encourage the government to allocate more of its funds towards the agricultural 
sector.  There has been proposed removal of the corporate tax on producers and 
processers in the agricultural sector as well (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2007: 58).  
However, this only expands the difference in opportunities between larger producers and 
smallholders. 
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Development partners and collaboration 
FASDEP also outlines the role of “development partners”.  The Policy 
emphasizes their role in providing “financial and technical resources”, engaging in policy 
dialogue, and concerting their actions with other stakeholders (Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture 2007: 49).  The development partners are also expected to monitor and 
evaluate, play a large role in research, and improve human development (Ministry of 
Food and Agriculture 2007: 50).  In short, FASDEP II largely depends upon the 
development partners’ efforts.  That would be viable only if they cooperate.   
FASDEP II outlines a major role for MoFA in monitoring and evaluation by 
carrying out annual performance reviews and publishing annual reports to communicate 
those results (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2007: 53).  The Ministry is given the role 
of coordinating the actions of the development partners.  The Policy gives the National 
Development Planning Commission the role of overseeing partnerships among the 
private sector, civil society organizations, and the public sector (Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture 2007: 50).  MoFA is given a large amount of responsibility in this area as 
well.   
This area of the Policy is expected to be successful.  The development partners 
have expressed the desire to collaborate, but no policies have outlined this previously 
(Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2007: 50).   
Like FASDEP II—on which METASIP is largely based—stakeholder 
consultation is prioritized.  Extensive processes were carried out to ensure that feedback, 
from groups such as sector ministries, researchers, NGOs, private sector actors, 
educational institutions, and regional and district officers, was used to formulate 
102 
 
METASIP.  In the consultative process, public vs. private sector representation was 
balanced (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 2).  This was used to create a “zero 
draft”, which was then discussed by stakeholder groups, such as Development Partners, 
before the final draft was formulated (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 2, 4).  
Stakeholder feedback on the “zero draft” was collected in each of the ten regions, and 
agricultural input supply actors also participated in penning the First Draft.  The draft was 
further circulated for comment and discussion in regional consultation workshops before 
its finalization.  Like FASDEP II, METASIP promotes collaboration among 
governmental organizations, the private sector, and civil society (Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture 2010: 4).  Customizing education and training programs to meet the needs of 
the agricultural sector and encouraging recruitment of women are further means of 
addressing the lack of agricultural specialists.   
        
Policy coordination 
The Ministry of Food and Agriculture recognizes the need for collaboration.  The 
Ministry intends to lead coordination among all stakeholders (Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture 2007: 48).  To do this, it intends to foster dialogue in policymaking and 
effectively use research findings.   
MoFA is expected to organize the logistic aspects of the Policy, play a large role 
in lobbying and advocacy, and develop inspections for agricultural exports.  FASDEP 
also outlines an audit of MoFA’s human resources by the Human Resource Development 
and Management Directorate.  MoFA is also expected to assess the consistencies of 
policies that relate to agricultural policy and those policies’ impacts on the sector 
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(Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2007: 51).  In doing so, data are expected to be 
disaggregated by sector and scale of farming endeavor so that future policies can be 
improved (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2007: 52). 
The Ministry is also given the responsibility of analyzing the impacts of macro 
polices on “the competitiveness of key agricultural exports and the effect of imports on 
domestic production” (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2007: 51).  Although this is 
pertinent to MoFA and the agricultural sector, FASDEP II should be focused on welfare 
rather than on promoting a particular industry; this has been the bane of several previous 
policies.   
For district-level implementation, FASDEP II objectives are to be given priority 
according to the district’s needs.  In addition, districts “will select 2 crops or livestock 
(breeds) annually to focus on for effective use of resources but not neglecting other crops 
or livestock from normal course of development”.  District-level plans should also be 
developed through collaboration with other stakeholders.  “Lack of composite budgeting” 
is noted as a “major limitation”.  In addition, district officers tend to work individually 
(Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2007: 52).   
Key problems that were identified with agricultural production that METASIP 
aims to solve are limited and inefficient irrigation, low adoption of advanced technology, 
high post-harvest losses, lack of efficient processing capability, inadequate financing, 
poor disbursement of extension services, lack of skills, and competition from imports 
(Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: xi).  METASIP intends to use already existing 
agency and stakeholder structures, and once again, MoFA is to lead (Ministry of Food 
and Agriculture 2010: xii).  
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            METASIP is to create systems of evaluation and standardization for all 
agricultural commodities.  These would apply to both domestic and export markets.  Use 
of proper labeling is a strategy (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 45).  The 
Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System (SAKSS) was established to support 
METASIP by aiding in its implementation and providing improvements.  SAKSS will 
include National Agriculture Research System institutions and local think tanks (Ministry 
of Food and Agriculture 2010: 74).  The role of the Secretariat is established to 
coordinate the Steering Committee, SAKSS, and the Policy Dialogue Group (Ministry of 
Food and Agriculture 2010: 75).   
 In addition, a monitoring and evaluation system specific to the agricultural sector 
has been implemented since its 2007 creation to observe effective and problematic areas 
within the agricultural sector plan.  However, the system faces the following problems: 
inadequately skilled staff, unreliable and inadequate technology (primarily, poor internet 
connectivity), and staff exhaustion (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 85).  The 
office of the President, Parliament, NDPC, MOFEP, Ghana Statistical Service, MDAs, 
Civil Society, NGOs, and various other organizations are involved in the monitoring and 
evaluation process.  The Policy, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Division of the 
Ministry of Food and Agriculture coordinates this system (Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture 2010: 86).  In addition, use of FBOs is to be intensified in METASIP 
(Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2010: 40).   
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Limited dissemination of information 
             Governmental bureaus have not coordinated well with each other.   For example, 
the national universities and the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) 
often conduct agricultural and other research without communicating with each other or 
the Ministry of Agriculture.  Therefore, many research endeavors are repeated, but the 
farmers are unaware of the findings.  In the rare event that some communications occur, 
typically only commercial, large-scale farmers benefit.  The improved seeds are usually 
only available for cash/export crops.  Though extension officers inform small-scale 
farmers about insecticides, fertilizers, improved seeds, better farming methods, 
agricultural equipment, and machinery, subsistence efforts do not gain enough of a profit 
to economically justify these investments.  Though the Ministry of Agriculture has 
started an irrigation program to hedge against climatic uncertainties, only growers of 
export or “import substitution” crops, such as rice, sugar cane, and cotton, receive the 
benefits; the typical consumer does not benefit.  Though the commercial farmers benefit 
from governmental investments and subsidies, the “food substitutes” are too expensive 
for the typical consumer to take advantage of them (Girdner et al 1980: 14-25). 
 
Mistrust of the Government rooted in a history of ineffective policy 
The Ghanaian governments have been notorious for “giving orders and issuing 
decrees with great fanfare but without adequate plans for implementation”.  This has led 
to a general sense of dissatisfaction with the government.  Results from a survey on the 
public sentiment following Operation Feed Yourself implementation support this 
conclusion.  Of the consumers who were questioned, 93 percent felt that they could not 
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easily feed their families, as 80-90 percent of their incomes were spent on food.  
However, the customers believed the government—not the farmers—to be at fault.  The 
majority of participants were upset with the policy; 90 percent believed OFY to be a 
failure, and 80 percent were unsatisfied with “the handling of food production in Ghana”.  
A very small minority—four percent—believed the government had kept most of its 
promises, 55 percent believed that only some were kept, and 35 percent felt that none had 
been followed through.  The vast majority of respondents believed policy-makers and 
executors were failing.  However, the majority of policy executors disagreed.  Though 75 
percent of policy executors believed food production to be “somewhat adequate”; 
weather conditions were blamed (Girdner et al 1980: 14-25).  
Many ineffective policy patterns are repeated.  Although state farms were a major 
failure in the 1960s, they are being re-introduced, again with the aim of increasing food 
exports and also to encourage agricultural jobs for the youth.  Some abandoned farms and 
those operating at less than full capacity have been targeted, but the major goal is to 
decrease unemployment by bringing youth into the agricultural sector (Ghanaian Times 
2009).  Many view state farms and expansion of agriculture as a means to ensure food 
security.  Because of this, the re-introduction of state farms to attract the youth to 
agriculture is one of the major platforms of the New Vision Party for the 2012 elections 
(Ghana News Agency 2010). 
 
Conclusion 
The agricultural sector continues to contribute the largest share of GDP.  The 
country’s economic performance is closely related to that of the agricultural sector 
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(Asuming-Brempong 2003).  Following the failure of Operation Feed Yourself in the 
1970s, Girder et al (1980: 14-25) noted that declining food production in Ghana seems to 
be caused by a strong bias in public policy towards supporting export crops.  Regardless, 
export crop production remains a priority, while domestic demands are neglected.  Those 
export crops (like cocoa) were heavily taxed by the marketing board, although these 
marketing boards were created to protect producers by offering price stability.  However, 
recent policies, such as FASDEP II and MEGASIP, encourage departure from 
dependence in cocoa and similar crops rooted in colonial times.  
The effects of policies promoting agricultural activities (through initiatives such 
as promotion of export commodities, exploitation of timber and forest resources, mining, 
and use of agrichemicals) have been largely detrimental to the environment.  However, 
the overall impacts—when livelihood is also taken into account—are mixed (Asuming-
Brempong 2003).  Recovery from the recession of the 1980s is one such example.  Older 
policies have tended to aggregate various categories of crops that have profoundly 
different needs for efficient cultivation and processing.  But requirements of 
Environmental Impact Assessments, promotion of disaggregated data in research 
endeavors and other progressive initiatives in recent policies, such as METASIP, are 
starting to solve these problems.  
Although Ghana’s economy is slowly diversifying, diminishing agricultural 
productivity due to progressively depleting soils is problematic.  This is mostly due to the 
combination of a complete lack of fertilizer, shifting cultivation and inadequate fallow 
periods.  METASIP has enacted subsidies so that the cost of fertilizer is unchanged from 
that of the previous year so that fertilizer use would not be discouraged.  However, recent 
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policies have not subsidized fertilizer further, although this could greatly bolster 
agricultural productivity and prevent soil degradation. Pesticides and herbicides are often 
used in too great of abundance, leading to contaminated foods and groundwater-
contaminating toxic runoff.  And while previous policies encouraged shifting away from 
agriculture, FASDEP II and METASIP are promoting increased activity within the 
sector.   
 The economy flipped between very strong state control and completely laissez-
faire economic policy.  Because of the resultant confusion, there continues to be lack of 
confidence in the government’s ability to formulate effective agricultural policy.  “Empty 
promises” by the government further erode confidence in it and diminish policy 
obedience.  Policies have been ineffective mostly due to lack of adequate funding.  
METASIP is in a financially precarious position, since it overlooks the fact that its 
projected budget grossly overshoots available funds.   
            Until recently, policy neglected smallholder farmers.  Although FASDEP II and 
MEGASIP have addressed this and problems with gender inequality, these problems are 
deep-rooted and therefore remain.  It is currently impossible to tell if these are other 
idealistic promises that will never be fulfilled or the beginning of real change. 
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Chapter 5: Summary and Policy Recommendations 
 
Over-zealousness to industrialize the country and a colonial mindset favoring 
resource exploitation in prior decades has crippled the Ghanaian economy.  The extent to 
which natural resources were wastefully exploited limits the ability of economic actors in 
the forestry and agricultural sectors to support themselves, more so in manner that can be 
sustained.  Over 65 percent of Ghana’s land area is devoted to agricultural endeavors, and 
agricultural productivity per hectare is declining, forcing farmers to expand cultivated 
lands.  Available land is sparse, and only about 20 percent of the land is forested (Trading 
Economics 2010).  Therefore, the great economic successes that Ghana has enjoyed 
recently must be viewed cautiously, in light of the rampant exploitation of the resources 
upon which Ghana relies.   
Some harmful trends have discontinued, such as policy incentives for sheer forest 
exploitation regardless of the economic implications.  However, there continues to be 
inadequate funding to invest in more viable long-term options, neglect of small-share 
operations, lack of recognition for communal ownership, and a pervasive view that 
unexploited forests are useless.   
Once again, Ghana is in the process of revitalizing state farms, which were a 
definitive failure during the 1960s and 1970s.  And to fund various agricultural 
endeavors, the Government encourages aggregation of smallholders with larger 
agricultural endeavors.  Most logging companies disregard regulations with impunity.  
The vast majority of this timber is exported to industrialized countries.  However, recent 
policy aims to verify exports to the European Union.   
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The lack of funding available to smallholders, particularly in the agricultural 
sector, greatly inhibits Ghana’s development towards enhanced food security, educational 
opportunities, and health care.  The agricultural and forestry sector provides by far the 
most support to the Ghanaian economy, and the majority of operations are subsistence 
efforts.  Without adequate credit, the investments necessary to foster long-term economic 
support are not possible.  The cost of something so basic as fertilizer is prohibitive to 
most farmers.  This degrades the soil, greatly harming the Ghanaian economy and 
threatening future generations.  Economic analyses have shown that the cost of fertilizer 
would be more than merely offset by the increased crop yields. 
 Although agriculture, forestry, and fishing contributed a very large proportion of 
the 2005 economic growth5, only 1.2 percent on average of the Government’s annual 
expenditures is allocated to the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (and Ministry of 
Fisheries, which only became a separate entity in 2005).  Government expenditures on 
agriculture expands to 5.2 percent when the Department of Forestry under the Ministry of 
Lands and Forestry, Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, and COCOBOD (the 
cocoa marketing board) is included (Benin et al 2008: 10).  In addition, the Agriculture, 
Forestry, and Fishing sector was allocated 8.1 percent of credit by deposit money banks, 
a 10.1 percent decline from 2005.  All other sectors’ credit allocations increased, with the 
exception of “miscellaneous” services.  Although manufacturing contributed only 8.6 
percent of Ghana’s overall economic growth in 2005 (the industrial sectors aggregated 
contributing 23.9 percent—therefore, non-cocoa crops and livestock alone contribute 
more than the entire industrial sector), 18.9 percent of credit was allocated to 
                                                 
5Agriculture, forestry, and fishing contributed 41.4 percent of the 2005 economic growth, crops and 
livestock alone 25.5 percent, cocoa 9.7 percent, and forestry 3.5 percent. 
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manufacturing, a 33 percent increase from 2005. Manufacturing grew by 5.5 percent in 
2005, industry by 5.6 percent.  Agriculture grew by 6.5 percent, in spite of sparse funding 
(GhanaWeb 2006: 23-25, 46).  As mentioned previously, this growth is mostly due to 
land expansion.  In addition, the vast majority of loans to the agricultural sector have 
been allocated to large operators that are not locally based and tend to be the worst 
environmental offenders.  Although loans to smallholders in the agricultural sector have 
been considered high-risk in the past, these are necessary to create the changes needed to 
sustain Ghana’s economy. 
  Rural sector industrialization is given too much priority.  Policy pushes for timber 
processing, which is wasteful because of inferior processing machinery.  Attempting to 
process all agricultural and forestry products for rapid industrialization is not the most 
prudent option when agriculture is far and away the most economically successful sector.   
In addition, there is nothing inherently superior in industrialization itself.  It is 
much less sustainable than a rural economy, and an agriculturally-based economy with 
good education and medical services could exist.  Manufacturing should not be pushed, 
but rather health services, research, and sustainable agricultural practices. 
Ghana’s strength lies in its closely-knit communities.  Financial resources should 
be structured in a manner that is compatible with this.  Communal loans might even be 
more secure than the more traditional individual loans, as it is less likely that a 
community would be unable to pay than an individual.  Communal reputation in repaying 
loans and cutting off financial resources to defaulting communities could be means of 
enforcing loan repayments. 
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The backbone of the economy rests on smallholder endeavors in the agricultural 
sector.  Policy must be crafted in a manner that recognizes this and provides incentives to 
act in a sustainable fashion and not comply with illegal loggers.  As stated by Onyeiwu et 
al in 2010: “Rural farmers in Africa will continue to use resources in unsustainable ways, 
as long as they are economically desperate, socially isolated, and politically 
marginalized.” 
Forcing the timber companies to pay taxes and to follow regulations would make 
a large impact.  Although the government is likely reluctant to do so for fear of 
discouraging business establishment, companies outside of the six or so that actually 
followed regulations in registering for permits harm the Ghanaian economy rather than 
support it.   
Although there have been great improvements in agricultural and forestry policy 
itself, these progressive initiatives are often not implemented.  Investing a much greater 
portion of governmental spending to fund the agricultural sector would greatly pay off.  
Simply providing major fertilizer subsidies would be one of the most effective solutions, 
assuming that border control is adequate to prevent smuggling. Similarly, motivating use 
of more efficient logging machinery would greatly benefit society.  
 It is imperative that Ghana implements sustainable forestry and agricultural 
policy.  The majority of its resources have already been wasted, and traditional 
subsistence from forest resources is no longer viable.  The livelihood of most Ghanaians 
now relies upon the performance of the agricultural economy.  Increasingly limited land 
availability and soil depletion in the face of a continuously growing population place 
Ghana in a precarious situation.  
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